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Hellenistic Philosophy in Greek and Roman Times

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Abstract

The new Hellenistic philosophies that emerged in Athens at the end of the 4th century BC – mainly Stoicism and Epicureanism – were largely non-original and second choice, compared to Plato and Aristotle. Unlike what happened with the works of Plato and Aristotle, the works of early Hellenistic era were lost on a large scale. However, they became the dominant philosophies of the next five centuries, and were extended from Greece to Rome and the distant provinces of the Roman Empire. A common element of the philosophers created in Hellenistic and Roman times is the connection of philosophy with individual life and its perception as an “art of life”. Philosophy ends up being a driver of life and a source of relief, a healing art, a way to cope with a hostile world. From the 4th century BC up to the first Christian centuries, Cynics, Stoics, Epicists and skeptical philosophers give a new role to philosophy.

Keywords: Stoicism, Epicureanism, Cynicism, Hellenistic era, Roman Empire.

1. Introduction

As professor Anthony A. Long says, in the early 1960s’ there were two predominant ideas for Hellenistic philosophy. One was that the new Hellenistic philosophies that emerged in Athens at the end of the 4th century BC – mainly Stoicism and Epicureanism – were largely non-original, and second choice, compared to Plato and Aristotle. Unlike what happened with the works of Plato and Aristotle, the works of early Hellenistic era were lost on a large scale. Was not this a sign of their failure to withstand the test of time and consequently of their minor importance? The other prevailing idea was that these philosophies were doctrinal and practical guides in life, that they had been hurriedly and casually designed as a compass to help those who had lost their stamina as a result of the loss of autonomy and prosperity of Greek cities after conquests of Alexander the Great.

Long quickly realized that, as others have now realized, these two prevailing opinions were completely wrong. The Greek world at the end of the 4th century was a highly prosperous community. What distinguished it from the pre-Alexandrian era was cosmopolitanism and the opening of borders to immigrants from Asia and Egypt. The new philosophies that developed in Hellenistic Athens, especially Stoicism and Epicureanism, were not only non-original, second-class and minor, but they became the dominant philosophies of the next five centuries, and were extended from Greece to Rome and the distant provinces of the Roman Empire. The loss of most Hellenistic texts is not a criterion of their low quality, but a historical accident explained by the courses of the European and Byzantine monasteries that maintained the Rule of the Greek

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Secretariat, which is still in force today.

The originality of Hellenistic philosophies and the central element of their success were the fact that they focused their attention on appeasement and pluralism on the challenge that these philosophies offered people to choose their way of life and understanding nature rather than just comply with the tradition and conventions of their culture. Becoming a Stoic or Epicurean was indeed a great thing – a decision about what to do with your life with all its personal, family, social and professional effects. These two schools offered radically different spiritual orientations, theologies, value systems, and emotional support concepts. For Plato and Aristotle there was only one philosophy – the theory and practices taught at the Academy and the Lyceum. These schools continued their activity during the Hellenistic period, but they were now disadvantaged and overcome by the new philosophical movements I just mentioned. The dominant choices were twofold, between the epicurean life of *araxia* and the stoic life of “perfecting our rational nature”.

2. Stoicism

Stoicism was a philosophical school of Hellenistic and Roman times. It has been one of the most important philosophical systems in Hellenistic philosophy. Their philosophy was formed over a period of more than four centuries, which is why it has taken on changes in the focus of its original interest, from the figures involved in Stoicism. According to surveys, it was set up in a troubled era to deal with it. For this reason, Stoicism as an anthropocentric content philosophy focused on the moral integrity of man. His representatives supported logic as a foundation stone for a virtuous and happy life. The latter seem to have been influenced by Socrates and his students (Zeller, 1923: 12-15).

Today, many works of the Stoics have not survived but only some of the writings of Seneca, Epiktitos and Marcus Aurelius. The Stoic school in Athens was founded in the 3rd century BC by Zenon the Kition, who has been a significant presence in Hellenistic philosophy for about six centuries. In the beginning, the Stoic philosophers were called “Zenonioi”, because of Zeno as the original tutor of the Stoic school. Then they were called “Stoics” or “Stoa philosophers” as Zeno’s apprentices watched his traditions at the Poikilis Stoa, a public building of the Athenian Agora, decorated with colorful frescoes by famous artists of the time. The main representatives were Zenon the Kition, Cleanthis and Chrysippus, Panaitios, Posidonios, and in the imperial stoicism the most basic representatives were Seneca, Epiktitos and Marcus Aurelius (Benatouil, 2009: 222).

Stoicism evolved from the Cynic School, a school founded by Socrates’ student Antisthenes. Although the interest of the Stoics differed according to the representatives of each time period, the teaching of morality was maintained from the beginning until the end of the Stoic teaching (Long, 1986: 115). It is worth noting that stoicism began as a cure against the passions of man and then acquired a philosophical substance. The eradication of passions lies in the pedagogical role of stoic morality. The Stoics were absolute about the expulsion of passions. The Stoic representatives of the first period are examples of temperance towards their passions. That is why many kings of that era called Stoic philosophers as advisors to the state or to educate their children. Ensuring apathy is difficult and sometimes cruel and inhumane, as man reacts in certain situations, freezing and indifferent, without being influenced by any emotion, such as death, which causes painful feelings. The wise man is at the same time the happy (Sharpe, 2013: 28-41).

In stark contrast to the Epicureanism, Stoic cosmology finds our world very orderly, well-structured to be a product of fortune or mechanical causes. The Stoics taught that only a superhuman mind could be the creator of this world. However, the Stoic deity is not, as claimed by Judaism and Christianity, transcendent, above nature, a creator who creates from nothing. Following the example of Plato, the Stoics saw the world as a gigantic organism, saturated with God as an energetic and vital energy that permeates everything. The Stoic God combines the idea

of a superhuman and creative mind with the idea of an infinite source of energy. In their cosmology the world is both matter and spirit (Sellars, 2006: 32).

Some Epicureans had sought independence from the pressures of conventional society, living in small communities. The Stoics, however, saw all communities as examples of how the ecumenical mind extends throughout the world, while being present in a particularly sophisticated way within our human nature. In the eyes of the Stoic everywhere, all people are relatives of each other. This affinity is due to the fact that we all share the same nature, not only physically but also spiritually. The basis of this common nature is our ability to talk and think. Why is there war and political controversy? Because, according to the Stoics, human beings generally fail to realize their common nature and membership of the global community (Graver, 2009: 88).

This teaches us that it is absurd for people who have a common, rational nature, and common interests to treat one another as foreign and exploitable. As a Stoic, you cannot combine irrationality with happiness. Given these starting points, Stoics rejected the naturalness of slavery and all forms of discrimination based on nationality, gender, wealth, social status, physique and reputation. In this philosophy of life, the long-term happiness of a person does not depend on race, birth, income, appearance or success in events outside the ego. Happiness lies solely in the duty of achieving inner and outer harmony, striving to adapt its rational activity to the benefit of all rational beings, to treat itself as the microcosm of the divine secular organization, to harmonize it according to the values of community and interdependence (Seddon, 2015: 217).

For a Stoic, bliss is incompatible with passion, but it is not (as most people present Stoicism) a cold state of affairs. The ideal stoic mentality is positively joyful, but it does not suffer from an obsessive desire. For a Stoic, a life that is highly satisfying is based on the awareness that it is in harmony with nature, with the nature of each as a human being and the world in general. For a Stoic, bliss is harmony, symmetry – these are the transports that characterize the stoic virtue and its ability to make a “citizen of the world” according to the wonderful phrase they used (Seddon, 2015: 217).

Thus, the main emphasis of Stoicism as a philosophy of life is to give people a deep sense of who they are, how they relate to each other, and how they can form themselves so that they feel within the universe as if they were at home, even if much that they would prefer for themselves is not feasible. Other than the auxiliary, Stoics saw people as shareholders of the divine and creative vital force. This theological dimension, along with their cosmopolitanism, influenced early Christianity along with the indifference of religion for the accidental circumstances of birth and the locality of the people.

Stoicism gained great power and is recognized as one of the most supportive of Oratios, Cicero, Marcus Aurelius, who embraced the Stoic principles of duty and morality. The influence of Stoicism on representatives of modern European philosophy such as Spinoza, Cartesius, Kant, Locke, Goethe and others (Karakatsanis, 2002) was also important. Stoicism held a dominant position in the Hellenistic era, which, due to its influence, is entitled to place as a philosophical system of importance the corresponding Platonism and Aristotelism, greater impact on the ethical aspect of the duties of the individual, in the Roman society (Becker, 2001: 33).

3. Epicureanism

Epicureanism is a system of philosophy based upon the teachings of the ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus, founded around 307 BC. Epicurus believed that what he called “pleasure” (ἡδονή) was the greatest good, but that the way to attain such pleasure was to live modestly, to gain knowledge of the workings of the world, and to limit one’s desires. This would lead one to attain a state of tranquility (*ataraxia*) and freedom from fear, as well as an absence of bodily pain

(*aponia*). The combination of these two states constitutes happiness in its highest form. Although Epicureanism is a form of hedonism insofar as it declares pleasure to be its sole intrinsic goal, the concept that the absence of pain and fear constitutes the greatest pleasure, and its advocacy of a simple life, make it very different from “hedonism” as colloquially understood (Wilson, 2015: 93).

It was originally a challenge to Platonism, though later it became the main opponent of Stoicism. Influenced by Democritus, Aristotle, and possibly the Cynics, Epicurus turned against the Platonism of his day and established his own school, known as “the Garden”, in Athens. He and his followers were known for eating simple meals and discussing a wide range of philosophical subjects, and he openly allowed women to join the school as a matter of policy. As evidence for this, Epicureans say that nature seems to command us to avoid pain, and they point out that all animals try to avoid pain as much as possible (Sharlps, 1996: 84). Epicureans had a very specific understanding of what the greatest pleasure was, and the focus of their ethics was on the avoidance of pain rather than seeking out pleasure (O’Keefe, 2010: 117-121).

Epicureans believed that senses also relied on atoms. Every object was continually emitting particles from itself that would then interact with the observer. All sensations, such as sight, smell, or sound, relied on these particles. While the atoms that were emitted did not have the qualities that the senses were perceiving, the manner in which they were emitted caused the observer to experience those sensations, e.g. red particles were not themselves red, but were emitted in a manner that caused the viewer to experience the color red. The atoms are not perceived individually, but rather as a continuous sensation because of how quickly they move. An extremely prolific writer, he is said to have originally written over 300 works on various subjects, but the vast majority of these writings have been lost. Only three letters written by him – the Letters to Menoeceus, Pythocles, and Herodotus – and two collections of quotes – the Principle Doctrines and the Vatican Sayings – have survived intact, along with a few fragments and quotations of his other writings. His teachings are better recorded in the writings of later authors, including the Roman poet Lucretius, the philosopher Philodemus, the philosopher Sextus Empiricus, and the biographer Diogenes Laërtius. Epicurus and his followers shunned politics. After the death of Epicurus, his school was headed by Hermarchus; later many Epicurean societies flourished in the Late Hellenistic era and during the Roman era (such as those in Antiochia, Alexandria, Rhodes, and Ercolano). Its best-known Roman proponent was the poet Lucretius. By the end of the Roman Empire, being opposed by philosophies (mainly Neo-Platonism) that were now in the ascendant, Epicureanism had all but died out, and would be resurrected in the Age of Enlightenment (Wilson, 2015: 54-55).

The school’s popularity grew and it became, along with Stoicism, Platonism, Peripateticism, and Pyrrhonism, one of the dominant schools of Hellenistic philosophy, lasting strongly through the later Roman Empire. Another major source of information is the Roman politician and philosopher Cicero, although he was highly critical, denouncing the Epicureans as unbridled hedonists, devoid of a sense of virtue and duty, and guilty of withdrawing from public life. Another ancient source is Diogenes of Oenoanda, who composed a large inscription at Oenoanda in Lycia (MacGillivray, 2012: 151-172).

4. Cynicism

Cynic was one of the longest-lasting philosophical schools in antiquity. Their school was founded by Antisthenes (445-360 or 444-368), son of an Athenian and a slave from Thrace, a distinguished warrior in the battle of Tanagra and later a student of Sophist Gorgias in Rhetoric, and then in philosophy of Socrates, to whose death he was present. The school was founded in the Cynogaras of Athens, the only high school in the city that received non-Athenian citizens and at the same time it was a sacred grove of Hercules (Long, 1996: 28). He was followed by Diogenes, who lived in a pot on the streets of Athens. Diogenes took Cynicism to its logical extremes, and

came to be seen as the archetypal Cynic philosopher. He was followed by Crates of Thebes, who gave away a large fortune so he could live a life of Cynic poverty in Athens. Cynicism spread with the rise of the Roman Empire in the 1st century, and Cynics could be found begging and preaching throughout the cities of the Empire.

The Cynics were spiritual descendants of Socrates, belonging to the school called “Minor Socrates”, although they had received enough evidence from the Sophists as to their teaching method. For Antisthenes and his disciples, philosophy is purely secular wisdom (the first is said to be that “then the cities are lost when they cannot distinguish the bad guys from the good ones”), while virtue, although still it remains a purpose of life, it is something absolutely practical which does not need much talk or tedious training (Diogenes Laertius, 6, 2).

Goods are distinguished only in two categories, the outside (property, physical pleasure, luxury) and the interior. The second is that the philosophers’ paramount demand, namely the secure knowledge of truth and the self, belongs. The Cynics, however, preach a “practical” ethics, in which virtue “paradoxically” does not depend on knowledge but it is the result of exercise, addiction and self-control. With a model of Heracles (Diogenes Laertius, vi. 2, 71), they call for personal self-sufficiency through the exclusion of so-called needs, as well as by walking into a natural way of everyday life, with simplicity, hardness and self-determination (Navia, 1996: 140). The “wise” of the Cynic is self-sufficient, having (by being) the wealth of all. By placing an emphasis on the daily way instead of the theory, the Ancients, Cynic descendants of the Antisthenes, traveled by a near-mural missionary from the extremity of the Hellenistic and Roman world, dressed poorly, with a shoulder bag to their little food, unconventional in all areas (as a rule, even denying those specific areas of socialism that were undoubtedly respected and honored by their founder Antisthenes), dirty, sloppy and provocative in their words and works, and established more a figure of attitude, form and behavior than an organized philosophical system (Cynics, n.d.).

5. Conclusions

Philosophy in Hellenistic era is intended to help a person who is confused with cultural and moral values through the transition to a new era to regain a sense of security based on himself and not on ideological or religious commitments of the past. Many have changed in socio-political organizations, education, art, leisure and material welfare of the Greek-speaking world. New choices are now open to people about their careers and new beliefs and ways of life are feasible. The cities have become huge, the populations are nationally complex, and the government is far from the lives of most people. The ancient Greek gods appear to many people too childish to be trustworthy, and very immoral to be admirable. Some people are attracted to foreign religions. There have been two centuries of scientific affairs and discovery. Every young man (but not every young woman) is free in Athens to listen to the lectures given by various schools of philosophy. Freedom of speech is almost absolute and people are not pressed to comply with the official religion of the state. The heroic ideal, as depicted in Homer’s epics, is a distant past. It is not a world where people face the choices of Achilles and Odysseus (Long, 1996: 277).

All Hellenistic philosophical choices were inspired by Socrates. That is, all linked long-term happiness to intellectual honesty, to mental state and character, to the autonomy of everyone. They all claim that happiness “depends on us”, or is in our power, regardless of how the outside world behaves (Long, 1996: 278).

A common element of the philosophers created in Hellenistic and Roman times is the connection of philosophy with individual life and its perception as an “art of life”. Philosophy ends up being a driver of life and a source of relief, a healing art, a way to cope with a hostile world. From the 4th century BC up to the first Christian centuries, Cynics, Stoics, Epicists and skeptical

philosophers give a new role to philosophy. The wise or the philosopher with the ascetic or stoic way of life gives a new pattern and indicates the path of disregard and inner freedom for the achievement of individual happiness. The interest in politics is diminished and ethics becomes central. With Neoplatonism, the shift from the perceptible world to the super sensus is observed. Philosophy gains a “entertaining” character, trying to lead the soul to the infinity, to the deity (Nussbaum, 1994: 3).

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Pedagogical Views of Plato in his Dialogues

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Abstract

Plato, through the dialogues of *Republic*, *Laws*, *Protagoras*, *Menon*, *The Symposium* and *Theetitos*, links inherently education with state stability. The proper functioning of the state machinery presupposes education and seeks the first foundation of political and social stability. The role of education at the social and political level is enormous, since it believes that the political instability of its time, the corruption of institutions and morals should be addressed through a political and social reform, based in particular on a rigorous control in the field of education.

Keywords: education, ethics, character soul, society.

1. Introduction

The 4th century BC can be characterized for Athens as the century of education, because it aimed at the realization of a pedagogical and cultural ideals. The reasons for this shift in interest in education depend on the social and historical circumstances of the time (Jaeger, 1971: 19-35, 2-26).

Because the end of the Peloponnesian War (404 BC) finds Athens defeated without the glory and cultural power it had as a city-state in the 5th century, the 4th century was a period of effort for internal and external rehabilitation, giving great importance to its spiritual power that is now oriented in a rational direction. Within this historical and social context, Plato develops his philosophical system, taking into account earlier philosophers, incorporating some elements of their own theory, or rebuilding and rejecting others.

Thus, he built his theory of education, always having as his main concern the rescue of the city-state and the formation, the education (*Republic*, 377b; *Laws*, 671c) of capable rulers to undertake this purpose (7th Letter, 326a). According to Plato, the reason for bad administration and misfortune is due to the impotence and the philosophical obedience of the rulers of any government, and requires the future governors to have sufficient knowledge of the work they are called upon to do.

2. Plato's *Republic*

In the *Republic*, in which the importance of justice for human life is theoretically examined (Sitos, 1985: 24), in order to be ideally organized, the highest authority is education, the weakness of which is considered to be responsible for progressive degeneration and the worsening

of its modern policy. The general aim of education, according to Plato, is to turn the whole soul into the idea of Good (*Republic*, 518 c-d). More specifically, education is the art of turning the soul, so that it can correct its wrong direction and turn to Good. That is, knowledge according to Plato is found in the soul, and man can reach eternal happiness and oppose evil through virtue, beauty of social institutions and education (Skouteropoulos, 2003: 22-23), which constitute the great work of life.

In the *Republic* (611b-c), the philosopher considers the nature of the student as a necessary condition for the development of educational work. It does not neglect the significance of hereditary preconditions (*Republic*, 424a), writing that: “αι χρησταί φύσεις καλῶς εκπαιδευόμεναι αποκτούν ιδιοσυγκρασίαν ἀκόμη καλυτέραν ἀπὸ τα φυσικά χαρίσματα των προγόνων των” (Isigone, 1964: 55). Parallel to heredity, it acts as an educative factor and the environment of the student. For this reason, it is recommended that the works of art that fall into children’s perception be perfectly morphed, because if they are raised through pictures of evil, the children will make the character bad, if, on the contrary, the creations that surround them have “τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ τε καὶ εὐσχήμονος φύσιν”, they will act on them as an aura that brings health from health (*Republic*, 401c).

He also states that the mind is the organ with which man reaches the perfect knowledge and is seen as the Good (*Republic*, 533d), while he calls wisdom the power for learning that the soul has of its nature (*Republic*, 518e) (Adam, 1975: 100). Thus, the process of knowledge takes place through four stages: in the first stage of conjecture, the soul knows through the images, in the second stage of faith, the knowledge is realized through the objects, which are the depiction of the previous stage, in the third stage of the intellect, mathematical sciences are located, while in the fourth stage of knowledge, the knowledge is completed. The first two stages are the visible part of knowledge, while the last two are the imaginary (*Republic*, 533e-534a) (Adam, 1975: 64-65)¹. At this point, Plato conceives the idea of the Good, which is at the top of the entity structure. (Ludwig, 1987: 70).

Thus, within this base of the theory of education, psychological theory and knowledge, Plato manufactures the educational program of a fair city, which is built on three levels: first education, an intermediate level of education and higher education, which is distinguished in dialectics and philosophy. The first training of the “new guards” (Guthrie, 1975: 455-157) includes music and gymnastics classes; the second level, courses such as Arithmetic/Geometry, Stereometry, Astronomy and Harmonics; young people at their choice at the age of twenty, and finally, the third level in which men and women of philosophical ability and character will proceed after ten years of study and will engage in the study of Dialectics (*Republic*, 376d-412b, 521d 535a, 535b-541a²).

Thus, the possibility and the need for a higher and tighter science, “dialectics”, which would differ from the rest, arises as: (a) it would confront the original assumptions of the sciences as mere starting points for discovering other proposals that will become accepted after examination and will constitute the “real principle of everything”. Thus, only logical conclusions will arise, (b) in this process no appreciable aids of imagination would be used (*Republic*, F, 511b-c).

¹ The line of platonic division of knowledge can be represented as follows: glory, meaning, conjecture, faith, intellect.

² For a class of slaves, Plato does not speak in his Republic. Slaves are tools, things (res) and their destination is to work and obey. With education, slaves can become dangerous.

In this way, dialectics would destroy the axioms of existing sciences (*Republic*, 533c), since they would deprive them of the character of the supreme axioms, showing that what is ultimately not false arises from even more fundamental truths (Taylor, 2000: 340).

Ultimately, Plato proposes a profound reform of the existing educational institution, making the city-state affair, while traditionally a private affair. At the same time, at the level of the first education follows the traditional Greek education of music and gymnastics. This, according to Jaeger, is due to the vivid contrast between his radical ideas and his conservative respect for tradition. In other words, the new Platonic philosophical system of education relies on foundations that were undoubtedly reformed, but did not disturb the traditional Greek education (Jaeger, 1971: 275).

Also, when Plato refers to the music of the first education does not mean only music as we mean it today. The word “music” in antiquity also had the concept of general cultivation and the “musical man” is not a good musician, but a cultivated and literate person. Also, the term music refers to everything that is attributed to the Muses, i.e. poetry, reasoning, mythology and more generally that it is now attributed to the term “good arts” (Michaelides, 1982: 18).

Through his *Republic*, we also learn from Socrates the objectives of the first education of the guards. These are summarized in the general configuration of their character (*Republic*, 377b; Adam, 1975: 110; Annas, 1981: 86)³, in the specific formation of their spirited character, in order to respond to their role in the city and to lead to bliss. At this time of their life, the cognitive soul of the guards is at the stage of conjecture and then of faith. On the other hand, art depicts (*Republic*, 377e), and that is why Plato uses Art in the first training of guards, since it is directly related to his knowledge.

3. Plato's *Laws*

Laws are Plato's most extensive textbook, which contains his latest and mature views on ethics, legislation and education. This includes the most important and the most detailed Platonic program of general education. It sees education as the foundation, but also the ultimate aim and essence of education, of the exercise of character, that is, of perfecting it, by means of discipline of the body, will and intellect. That is why he was trying to reconcile spiritual and moral education, because only moral work can be distorted with unpleasant consequences and social implications.

Its general principles are the same as those of the *Republic*, although there are some substantial changes that may be due to the fact that the issue of education is technically more detailed and demanding in this dialogue. Education under Plato is not only one of the many functions of the state, but includes all other functions.

The 7th Book of *Laws* lists the basic education program of the second city that Plato plans. Education, as in the *Republic*, is not only a matter of the city-state, but it is spread to all citizens, it is democratized and even becomes obligatory for the citizens of both sexes. Children

³ J. Annas noted that Plato is the first thinker who systematically defends the idea that education concerns mainly the behavior and the shaping of character, rather than the acquisition of information or skills. It also notes that it is surprising that there is no reference to “academic education”, while others consider acquiring some basic skills – reading, writing – given. On the above, Plato in the B and C books actually refers only to music and gymnastics and the emphasis is on the moral conformation of the character, as seen in several parts. It is only in 536d-537a that teaching mathematics and geometry and other preparatory courses should begin from childhood, but not in a coercive manner, but in the form of a game with the aim of better distinguishing the nature of each subject in which is returned to the *Laws*.

belong more to the state and less to their parents. Also, the educational process takes place in special buildings inside and outside the city by foreign salaried teachers (*Laws*, 804c-805e).

During pre-school education (three to six years old), children will watch groups of games in a specific place under the supervision of a female official (*Laws*, 794a-c). In formal education (from six to nine years old), the education of young people will be based on the diploma of music, which includes dance (*Laws*, 812a-813a, 654b), poetry literature (*Laws*, 810b-812a) and some elementary mathematics, writing and reading, in order to cultivate the soul, and gymnastics, which includes dance and wrestling, as well as other events such as sword fighting, bow, javelin, one- and two-stage road, horseback riding, hunting, etc. (*Laws*, 794d, 796d, 814-816, 832d-834a), for body development (*Laws*, 795d).

Then Plato proposes an educational program in which young people from 10 to 13 years will dedicate themselves to literature and from 13 to 16 years of playing the lyre. At a next level of study, the Athenian claims that all citizens need to know the basic points of mathematics, geometry and astronomy, but without having to study these objects in detail. This knowledge is a preparation for higher forms of research (*Laws*, 747b, 809d, 818c-d). Thus, for the first time, the idea of a secondary school, intended for more advanced studies of boys and girls, is being captured by skilled teachers who do their job organized and paid (Taylor, 2000: 548). These lessons need to be taught to the citizens, so that there are no gaps in the laws of the city and because they are true, beneficial and dear to God (*Laws*, 820e, 821b). It is also necessary to teach geometry and mathematics to recognize asymmetries, as did astronomy teaching to correct the ignorance of the Greeks for the given circular motion of the planets whose circular movements play a vital role in the argument of Plato for the existence of the God (Stalley, 1983: 133; Jaeger, 1978: 258).

Also, in the Platonic text of the *Laws*, the philosopher deliberately refuses to speak about the education of the members of the higher institution of the city, unlike the *Republic* where it is evident that the selected guardians of the second level of education are engaged in the study of Dialectics/Philosophy in a high level of study. Of these, the choice of the kings-philosophers of the city will eventually become available, because only those who have participated in such a course can understand (*Laws*, 968e).

Only at the end of the *Laws* (*Laws*, 961a) states that the members of the night board must study in depth mathematics and astronomy, while at the same time they have to distinguish a common meaning between the many and dissimilar things, giving a reasonable proof (*Laws*, 965c), referring to the study of Dialectics in the *Republic*. Finally, it is necessary to link their previous knowledge and studies to the knowledge of music (*Laws*, 967e), the significance of which, according to Stalley and Saunders, is ambiguous. Plato sometimes uses the word “music” when he refers to “philosophy”⁴ (Stalley, 1983: 134; Saunders, 1972: 10). This is probably the philosophy that enables the night board to consolidate its studies, which once again refers to the philosophical studies of *Republic*.

Regarding the extent of education in the *Laws* we would say that it is very large and deals with the first education of the citizens. The greatest weight is given to dance, music, poetry and literature. Plato, that is, once again he supports the first education in Arts. Besides, the recognition criterion of educated and cultivated man is his ability to dance beautiful dances but also to sing fine songs (*Laws*, 654a)

Education, as defined by Plato in the *Laws*, is the one that trains man from his childhood to virtue and inspires the desire to love her. More specifically, education is the guidance

⁴ For the similarities, but also differences, of the highest level of education between the *Republic* and the *Laws*, see W. Jaeger, *Paideia: The ideals of Greek culture*, vol. III, Oxford University Press, 1978, pp. 260-262.

and education of young people in the right language (*Laws*, 643e) with a view to their proper education so that they are good at any occupation they will perform as adults (*Laws*, 643b).

The above goal will be achieved by properly educating the feelings of child's pleasure and pain, first child's sensation, through the right addiction so that they love what must be loved and hate what must be hated before it is even developed the ability to rational thinking and judgment (*Laws*, 653a, 653b-c). Indeed, according to Lamprellis, the achievement of the agreement of delight and regret, before the word is still spoken, is made with the contribution of imagination. The role of imagination is fundamental, since it can bring the real compassion to pleasure and regret, but it is also the expression of the difference that distinguishes the individual's relationship with pleasure and regret at the level of thought.

Therefore, starting Plato from the discovery of excessive pain in human life, and therefore of excessive regret, he considers it necessary to establish holidays, which will satisfy the pleasure that is lacking in everyday life. These celebrations consist of dance, music and odes (*Laws*, 653c-d)⁵, elements that Plato hasten to define as the first education.

In addition, according to Plato, education is or probably has a close relationship with the game. Children are educated or trained through the game because they are used as a means to establish the laws and produce the right morals to the citizens⁶. This is why new games are forbidden because they encourage the desire for change. Besides, the man himself is a kind of play in the hands of the God, who is meant to live a peaceful life, playing the game, namely sacrifices, dance, music and songs (*Laws*, 643b-c, 819b, 797a, 798c-d, 803c-804b).

In connection with the above position is – according to Stalley – the Plato's playword for the relationship between education-training and children-games. It uses the contrast between the children and the study that works in two ways: (a) play as something fun can compete with the effort; and (b) the game as something that has no value beyond the pleasure it provides can be contrasted with the serious activities being done for some purpose. Using these interconnections Plato can formulate the paradox that children-game is a study, that is, a serious issue. This is because on the one hand child education is the most serious thing and on the other, because the most serious work of adults is a kind of divine-inspired play (Stalley, 1983: 130).

In conclusion, we observe that in *Laws*, education and its aims, as well as the use of Art in Plato's educational program, are defined on the basis of more realistic positions that have no direct relation to the ontological, gnostic or metaphysical foundations of the *Republic*. In the *Laws*, Plato turns to the psychological basis of education and begins to attempt to form the unconscious self through the regulation of the first natural senses of man (Jaeger, 1971: 214, 223, 251)⁷. Within this context, the role of Art in education is active and decisive. That is why in Book 2 he deals very closely with the criteria relating to aesthetic issues. Art can contribute to the achievement of virtue, which is the purpose of education, as long as it is discovered and recognized its essence, which is not what is happening in its time.

⁵ Still at 664b-d we learn that the basic dances that take place in the city's celebrations are three: the children's dance, the dance of young men and the dance of the elders. Plato is more interested in the third dance of the elders, because he will set the criteria by which the songs and dances of the two other dance groups (670d-671a) will be judged.

⁶ This can be understood because the game is a typical case to get joy from compliance with rules. Thus, Plato, linking education and teaching the various lessons with the game, can in a "painless" way lead young and future citizens to their voluntary obedience to the laws, which are also rules – inconspicuous, which is also linked to a masterful way, with the definition of education as defined in the *Laws* and especially in 643e.

⁷ Jaeger argues that Plato's shift from the state's ontology and gnosis to the history and psychology of the *Laws*, in terms of moral and educational issues suggests a complete turn of Plato's philosophical attitude.

4. Plato's *Protagoras*

Protagoras contains the fullest and the oldest description of the character and the purposes of sophisticated “education in virtue” (Taylor, 2000: 282-283).

In the Dialogue of *Protagoras* in the big battle of Socrates – Protagoras, Plato tries to support his position that the virtue (which according to Lesky is both a technical and moral skill) is taught just as Geometry or Medicine and is related to the activity in the city (Ziogos – Karasgiriou, 1996: 26). His arguments are based on the fact that “political virtue” is exclusively a matter of justice and wisdom, since no member of the community can be considered incompetent in such matters. On the other hand, every citizen, when it comes to expressing a view of justice or wisdom, is naturally supposed to have the necessary knowledge, even if he is deprived of them (Taylor, 2000: 287-288). That is why no one is reprimanded as ugly, petty or sick, but accepts the general pity. On the contrary, people are reprimanded and punished for their moral errors. Thus the existence of criminal law proves that “virtue” is considered to be taught (*Protagoras*, 323c-324d).

So, for Protagoras, morality depends on the law and is even a product of civilization. To support his view, he refers to the educational process. Initially, parents and servants are constantly engaged in learning the child from early childhood to the right and wrong work that is later undertaken by the teacher of elementary education who teaches boys reading from the ethics of the poets, writing, lyra, but also their behavior. Finally, the trainer tries to give them a good soul and manlike character (Taylor, 2000: 290).

After schooling, when the boy becomes adult, the city gives him with its laws the rule that must govern his behavior in life and punishes him if he does not learn to “command and to be commanded”. Thus, the whole life of the citizen constitutes an uninterrupted process of learning the virtue (*Protagoras*, 325c - 326e).

In conclusion, according to *Protagoras*, the nature of the student is the only responsible thing for the fact that from the appearance of vicious men results virtuous parents. This happens because teaching can be effective only if there is intelligence. Even vicious citizens, thanks to continuous and intensive teaching, have somehow assimilated it. Consequently, the achievement of political virtue is a continuous process, within organized societies, which is learned as “a mother tongue learning” and which does not necessarily require the presence of a teacher. Then what is the role of Protagoras? He moderates himself with modesty as a better teacher of political virtue, who can benefit his disciples more than other teachers (*Protagoras*, 323d).

In Plato's *Protagoras*, Socrates's pedagogical art did not consist in the peculiarity of his method or the secret power of his personality, but mainly in the fact that through the rethinking of the moral problem to the problem of knowledge he first created the precondition, which was lacking in sophisticated pedagogy. The Sophists' claim to the protest of the formation of intellect cannot be justified solely by the need for success in life. What is being sought in this agitated era is the knowledge of a supreme rule that binds and compels all, since it is the expression of the deep nature of man and on which the law will be based, in order to be able to assume the highest mission, creating the truly virtuous man. This cannot be achieved through the knowledge and practice of the sophists, but only through the deeper knowledge to which the societal reflection was directed (Jaeger, 1971: 167-185).

5. Plato's *Menon*

No other Platonic dialogue begins as abruptly as *Menon*. The subject of the debate revolves around the following question: “Is it possible to teach the virtue?” (*Menon*, 90a). If not,

then is it something that is guaranteed by practice? If it is not acquired by teaching or practicing, is it “innate”? If it is being acquired in another way, who is that? (Taylor, 2000: 166).

The solution proposed is based on the fact that there are two different levels of “virtue”. One is sufficient for the ordinary good citizen, even for the “*epikourous*”, while the other, the upper level, is necessary for public men. Those who have the task of obedience to rules stemming from the ideals of the true politician simply ought to discipline themselves in the absolute faithful observance of the traditions in which ideals are embedded. This discipline is ensured when the temperament, the sense of the beautiful and the imagination are formed according to the specifications of the *Republic* (Chapters G-D). However, such education does not result in personal knowledge but at most in the belief in a high standard of life, adopted by individuals on the basis of trust. Thus, the “virtue” of the social classes being administered is not something that is learned, but something taught is not a product of enlightenment but a consequence of discipline (Taylor, 2000: 166-167).

On the contrary, the public man, whose work is the creation of national traditions, has greater needs. He must know and have personally understood genuine moral “values”. Therefore, it needs to have a philosophical virtue based on direct personal awareness of the structure of the universe and the position of man within it. Such awareness can be acquired by the trained man in arduous scientific thought as an end in itself. It follows that this awareness is “knowledge” and, like all knowledge, is assured by teaching, only the latter is not merely the transmission of findings, but is achieved by the stimulation, within his soul, power and ambition to think he himself on his behalf. That is why the only effective teaching method in the fields of philosophy and science is the spiritual bond between two men, a senior and a younger, engaged in “original exploration”.

Then, when Menon attempted to define the virtue, he did not come at all to a satisfactory definition. Thus, it was mentioned in the “sophisticated” paradox that “research” is impossible, since it is impossible to inquire about something he knows or about something he ignores (since in the second case, even if he managed to find the object of his research, he would not even recognize it). But the dilemma dissolves if a teaching that Socrates learned from “priests” (*Menon*, 81a), according to which our soul is immortal and our present life is simply an episode of its history. If this is the case, then the soul must have learned everything a long time ago. In order to regain knowledge of something temporarily forgotten, she only needs to “concentrate” and carefully follow the indications given by her “memory”. Thus, in fact, learning is the process of “recall” (recollection). For this sophisticated argument that it is impossible to learn a new truth is simply a manifestation of intellectual dullness (*Menon*, 80e - 82a).

It is the first time we encounter the teaching of memory (Ziogos – Karasgiriou, 1996: 26), which asserts that through the above process we can recover the lost knowledge we once learned (Taylor, 2000: 171-172).

In *Phaedon*, this fact finds its example in the way in which random associations can trigger a series of thoughts, when for example the view of a missing friend’s portrait makes us begin to think about it. So what is emphasized is not the Orphic perception of the pre-existence of souls and the transfiguration, which Socrates asserts that he taught it by poets and priests, but rather the role of the experience of the senses that is full of truths which he suggests belong to a level of understanding such that the experience of the senses itself is not sufficient for its complete representation or recognition.

Although this teaching refers to the immortality of the soul, its importance for philosophy lies in the fact that the acquisition of knowledge does not consist of the role of the passive receiver of a “teaching” but of the continuation of a personal intellectual effort on the occasion of an impressive element of experience of the senses. If there was not such a “disguised manifestation” of the experience of the senses, “the ignava ratio” of the pugnacious would actually apply, the notion that “no one can teach the truth, because if you do not know it in advance, you

will understand for the truth, when the teacher express her". So we see why both Socrates and Plato advocate that "knowledge" can only be acquired through personal participation in "research" and not simply hand-to-hand (Taylor, 2000: 172).

It is therefore reasonable that the "excellent men" of Athens do not owe their value as political leaders in knowledge, because if they did, they would be able to teach "the status of the public man" to others. So Themistocles and the rest were not political scientists (*Menon*, 97b), a conclusion also found in *Gorgia*. However, it would be absurd to think that they owe all their achievements to luck. The reason for their success has to be their "right opinion" (*Menon*, 99b). They looked, we would say, with the diviners, who often have to say very good things without knowing it. We can therefore classify the diviners, poets and public men as individuals who perform wonderful achievements without knowing what they say or what they are doing, since they act under the influence of "inspiration" (*Menon*, 99d).

In conclusion, virtue is neither innate nor learned by teachers, but comes from a good luck "irrational mania", unless of course a public male capable of teaching politics is presented to others. Of course, the meaning of these observations can be fully illuminated through the *Republic* and *Phaedon*. The "politician, capable of making some other politician", is just the king's philosopher.

Taking into account this educational program, we can see that the main purpose of the reasoning of the last part of the *Menon* is to distinguish between a superior and inferior kind of virtue. The highest is called philosophical virtue in the *Republic* and is based on the personal identification of the proper hierarchy of goods. That's why it's permanent and stable. The inferior is, at best, a mere shadow of true virtue and based on "opinions" which, although correct, are not knowledge. This does not ensure its permanence and stability, since it merely relies on the assumption of a right lifestyle. The second type is all that is required in the state even by the soldiers. Their virtue consists in the faithful observance of the traditional and exquisite lifestyle they were raised with, but they never asked to know why. Since the ethical heritage of every civilized society contains the right elements, Athenian politicians, having inherent the best traditions of the city, can benefit the state through the virtue of this inferior kind, the popular virtue, as it is characterized in *Phaedon*. However, the permanent and steady continuation of the euphoria is ensured only when the correct traditional code of conduct becomes "knowledge" through the understanding of the reasons, that is, through the personal awareness of the character of the "good" and the position held by each "good" of life within its hierarchical scale virtue.

Thus, a real politician is the Socratic philosopher, who understands the principle that the "care" of the soul is the supreme work of the individual and the state, correctly distinguishing the nature of the "spiritual health" that this "cure" seeks. It is easy to see then that "philosophical virtue", if it coincides with the knowledge of the real good, must be "learned" (provided of course that its teaching is attempted correctly). On the contrary, a virtue that is not based on conscious principles is not taught. Man can only learn from it through his addiction to tradition (Taylor, 2000: 179-180).

Thus, the people's wisdom about the teaching of virtue is explained by the ambiguity of the word "virtue": the world realizes that true virtue presupposes the awareness of certain intelligent principles, so it must be learned. But it confuses this true virtue with its shadow, faithful observance of an established tradition simply because it is established, and shared experience shows that this reflection of genuine virtue, as it is assured, is not guaranteed by teaching.

6. Plato's *Theaititos*

The project explores the nature and types of knowledge. Socrates directs the word in such a way that the *Theaititos* makes a first definition of knowledge as a sense, a second as a true

judgment (*Theaitetos*, 187b) and a third definition according to which knowledge is the true judgment is accompanied by the reason (Kolokontes, 1993: 3-7).

7. Plato's *Symposium*

In the *Symposium*, the central themes of the Platonic theory of ideas are clearly prepared, the power of love is glorified, according to Diotima, his path is driven from the physical to the psychologically beautiful, until he reaches the beauty of knowledge within the region of the pure spiritual pursuit (Ziogos – Karasgiriou, 1996: 26).

The relationship between the symposium and the educational love is the basis of the platonic dialogue. Symposiums were one of the regular meetings of teacher and student. Love is something between mortal and immortal, it is a great spirit, a demon that acts as a mediator between gods and men (*Symposium*, 202e). The concept of love becomes the epitome of the whole human struggle for the acquisition of the good. Thus, the erotic personality is philosophical personality, because it is governed by a space for the creation of commons, acts and institutions of goods, from a constant birth within the good. Such a personality is mostly educational, because it takes the pupil's soul near it, opens a dialogue with it with great prospects and gives it all the possibilities for creation and fruitfulness. The relationship between a teacher and a student is not self-centered, but the purpose of both is the bliss that can only exist in relation to the good. The Platonic teacher really sets great goals in the student's soul, which must not be lost in the mortal chatter if it is to be led to unity and bliss (Jaeger, 1971: 240-261).

8. Conclusions

Plato's views on the treatment were and are very important. It sets out an integrated education program aimed at educating the right citizen. Classical are his reservations, but also his strongly negative attitude to certain types and forms of art. His *Republic*, perhaps, is the most fascinating exposition of the Platonic theory of ideas, the relationship of subject and object to the cognitive process, the theory of truth.

The 5th-century Greek in his everyday choices obeys the Word and reproduces it as a common reason. The subject and the others are necessarily in relations of reference which are a precondition for accepting the unique and unprecedented way in which each one approaches the Word. And, of course, share in the Word is the precondition of true, indeed real. And the reason for the share is the exemption from individuality and at the same time the ability to expose the individual concept to the verification of common experience.

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The Idea of Tolerance – John Locke and Immanuel Kant

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Abstract

This study aims to present that the most visible and drastic changes in the life of modern humans are caused by the ability human to be a person that is equal to be tolerant. From a historical point of view, the manifestation of tolerance towards people has always been problematic – for some it is in short supply, and for others it has been in surplus. In the first case, it has caused conflicts and wars to win it, in the second, sanctions and repressions. The tolerance has been and is the subject of many analyzes, philosophical concepts, ethical schemes, and socio-political mechanisms that construct societies. This article is explored John Locke and Immanuel Kant's position on the tolerance described in their scientific papers *A Letter Concerning Toleration* and *Perpetual Peace*. In the introduction is said that the tolerance has many dimensions. In its essence, it is always pluralistic, implied consent, freedom, continuity, understanding, equality, etc. It is a segment of achieving interpersonal, group, intergroup, inter-community and international relations. The first subtopic is about tolerance in historical contextual links. The second is about Locke and his Letter – Locke's letter of the tolerance from 1689, which supports the idea of the need for religious tolerance, it is not only a recommendation, but also a condition for a peaceful and just cohabitation of citizens in a society – this is the century, when England sets up its own church, which strives to distinguish both from the Roman Catholic and the Protestant – creating a Protestant church – the Anglican church. Before Locke published a Letter of Tolerance, after his return to England in 1689, after his immigration to the Netherlands, he published two other fundamental works: *Two Tracts on Government* and *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689). The third sub-topic is about Kant and his concept of the possible perpetual peace – the theory of “perpetual peace” was created by Kant at the end of the 18th century. According to him, as relations within a state can be regulated wisely in order to maintain internal peace, and relations between people from different countries could be wisely regulated in order to achieve external peace. Kant thinks that moral-practical reason obliges us to exclude wars, otherwise it would mean that we have to give up our mind and be equated with the animals. In the conclusion is noted the great contribution of ideas from the works of Locke and Kant is the basis of the American Constitution and the Declaration of Independence and how much tolerance we need today in a globalized world.

Keywords: John Locke, Immanuel Kant, peace, tolerance.

“Without man and his potential for moral progress, the whole of reality would be a mere wilderness, a thing in vain, and have no final purpose.”

Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*

1. Introduction

The tolerance has many dimensions. In its essence, it is always pluralistic, implied consent, freedom, continuity, understanding, equality, etc. It is a segment of achieving interpersonal, group, intergroup, inter-community and international relations. As well as a finding of the existence or non-existence of this pluralistic tone in the relations between people, groups, societies, even the person himself to himself. This means that tolerance is always an intent that is tasked with finding an adequate path to “Other” or “the Difference”, not to counter it, but to illustrate, translate and make it understandable and accessible, that is to say it adapts. Thus, the tolerance occurs and manifests itself in different forms: it can be ethnic, religious, national, cultural, etc., but at its core lies the main task of accepting the differences as natural and necessary for individuals. Through and in tolerance, these differences are assessed as peculiar qualities that enrich human appearance and knowledge.

2. The tolerance

In view of the historical and philosophical approach which we will use here, we will focus our attention on the tolerance, its culturally identical context as a factor in human relations in historical development.

The tolerance is essentially a priori enshrined in globalization as a process – the tolerance is the vehicle and way of cosmopolitanism. But it is also a great regret that in order to project something on the whole, it is sometimes inevitable that the resistance of individual localities, i.e. globalization by its own conceptual design, is tolerant, but as a projection into the real social spaces of different historical times is not always the case. Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* treats the tolerance as “consistency” or “consent” (Aristotle, 1995: 23). To be classified as a virtue, the tolerance must be more than ordinary benevolence and friendship. It has to pervade the possible shortage or excess of quality. This is possible when tolerance is perceived as consistency. The coherence in itself implies the same way of assessing common interests. Thus, the tolerance as the main argument for agreement in interpersonal relationships both in conceptual and socio-cultural aspects has a lasting presence in the historical space. However, this tolerant coherence has its limits. Boundaries beyond which an individual ceases to be a person: if he is swallowed up by the whole (that is, if he fails to preserve his individuality) by becoming the background of the others, melting into them; as well as when the peace of mind is compromised by questioning the possibility of a pluralistic difference in personality.

The history of interpersonal relations in the era of the European Enlightenment of the 17th/18th century is an interesting move. During this period, the need for reconciliation and the requirement of tolerance is in direct connection and is a direct consequence of the tragic experience of religious wars that began immediately following the Reformation processes: The Huguenots’ persecution in France; the Civil War in the Netherlands, and the Thirty Years’ War in England, followed by the Puritan Revolution and the subsequent Cromwell dictatorship. This is also the time when the tolerance and the leniency among individual people are rising to the desired moral social norm.

3. John Locke – “A Letter Concerning Toleration”

In this context, the basis of the modern concept of tolerance is shaped. Its creator is John Locke. As noted Boris Manov, Locke is “the first author in the history of European thought, who specifically addresses the issue of the tolerance in human relations, and because the ideas he develops lie at the basis of all further theoretical interpretations and political documents related to the justification and practical implementation of the principles of tolerance in the life of society

– between individuals and social groups, between different religious, political, cultural, ethnic and other organizations and institutions within countries and in relations between countries internationally, including to this day” (Manov, 2010: 58).

Locke’s *Letter of Tolerance* from 1689, which supports the idea of the need for religious tolerance, is not only a recommendation, but also a condition for a peaceful and just cohabitation of citizens in a society – this is the century, when England sets up its own church, which strives to distinguish both from the Roman Catholic and the Protestant – creating a Protestant church – the Anglican church. Before Locke published the Letter, Locke after his return to England in 1689, after his immigration to the Netherlands, published two other fundamental works: *Two Tracts on Government* (Locke, 1967: 1) and *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689) (Locke, 1948: 1). In the second treatise, he sets forth his theory of the political structuring of the social space and of the functions and form of civil society. In *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, he attaches great importance to experimental knowledge through sensuousness as the only adequate cognitive approach. Another moment in his theory, which is criticized and unacceptable, is the characteristic of Locke’s psychological treatment of experience, when it too far away from the objective nature and essence of external reality (Locke, 1948: 29).

The Letter by Locke appeared on the occasion of a rather complicated time for England. It was published almost immediately after Locke return to England in 1689, which he left in 1683 as he left for the Netherlands after the defeat of the wizards. The Letter was written during his immigration to the Netherlands between 1685 and 1686. Initially it was published in Latin language as an anonymous text in May 1689 in the Netherlands, but its translations into Dutch and French language quickly appeared, yet another proof of the problems and the need for tolerance that have occupied the minds of an English immigrant – problems and necessities related to tolerant socialization of societies, which is characteristic of the whole of Europe.

Itself the Letter is an attempt to reflect on the complex social relationships in English society. Right from the beginning of the Letter, Locke summons for a clear distinction between the tasks of civilian governance and those of religion, as well as a clear boundary between them. The main reason for this division is the different goals and tasks that the State should be able to achieve and resolve on the one hand – in particular, the civilian ruler as representative of secular power, and on the other hand, the Church as an institution.

Here’s what the State is, according to Locke: “The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolence of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like” (Locke, 1983: 6); and what the Church should be: “A church, then, I take to be a voluntary society of men, joining themselves together of their own accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the salvation of their souls” (Locke, 1983: 9). These definitions are clearly restrictive as they unequivocally fix the scope of the jurisdiction of the two institutions, as well as the clear distinction and differences between them. The role of the civilian ruler as an emanation and expression of a civic interests and not of the religious preferences of the people is extremely important. It is also necessary to tolerate individual personal religious preferences because we cannot speak of religious orthodoxy referring to the personal preferential preferences of the ruling rulers that predetermine the beliefs and destiny of each individual citizen. Locke writes: “First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another as to compel anyone to his religion” (Locke, 1983: 7); “Second (...) true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. And such is the nature of the understanding, that it cannot be compelled to the belief of anything by outward force. Confiscation

of estate, imprisonment, torments, nothing of that nature can have any such efficacy as to make men change the inward judgment that they have framed of things” (Locke, 1983: 7-8), and “Third (...) No man by nature is bound unto any particular church or sect, but everyone joins himself voluntarily to that society in which he believes he has found that profession and worship which is truly acceptable to God” (Locke, 1983: 9).

In these three arguments Locke attempts to give a political explanation of the need to distinguish the various functions and prerogatives of the exercise of power, of the cardinal differentiation of the prerogatives of governing society, in the world between the secular and the spiritual or, more clearly, the separation of the Church from the State. As a representative of the political power, the city governor would have to deal with political issues, not the theological-gnoseological speeches and problems of religion and the Church. Thus, Locke lists the cases in which the civilian governor should not tolerate, but to alert the government and society to the relationship in attempting to exert a superiority between the Church and the State, to observe the limits of the possible interactions between the two institutions, as well as their individual representatives – whether politicians or church officials: “I say, first, no opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate” (Locke, 1983: 34); “That Church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate which is constituted upon such a bottom that all those who enter into it do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince” (Locke, 1983: 35); “A church whose members enter into it under the protection and service of another ruler” (Lock, 2008: 74); “Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of a God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all; besides also, those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretence of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of a toleration” (Locke, 1983: 36). What is said by Locke with these four arguments is that if tolerance is manifested, in such cases it would lead to the breakdown of the civil society, which is actually the basis of the State. While these arguments are a kind of invocation to and intolerance of everything that would endanger people’s civic interests, the actions of their removal as a behavior are an indispensable duty of the civilian governor.

We could summarize, considering the theory of Locke for the Civil Society, which he put forward in *The Two Tracts on Government* and in the Letter that he continues to uphold and defend his political argumentation that freedom is good only in a society in which there are laws and reasonable constraints, therefore, the right of an individual to freely follow his religious beliefs is not a natural but a political right. But this can only happen in: well-settled societies that are well regulated by the secular authority, and any action by the civil governor should be directed at the peace and in the interest of society as a whole. It is important to note the following. From the point of view of our day, the Letter does not sound particularly tolerant. It could even be argued that, from the point of view of contemporary theoretical developments and legislation, Locke’s views not only look archaic, but also at times defend the cause of intolerance – for example: his thesis that: following the religious beliefs of the individual are not a natural right, but only a political one or the lack of desire for religiosity by the individual, atheism – to be a problem. But, from the point of view of his time (in the 17th century), his ideas are progressive, because even today, in terms of the philosophy of law, they are extremely relevant. For example:

- The definition on the State is in the spirit of political liberal teleology, that is, as he writes, the task of the State is only to protect the civil interests of its members as it does not have to comply with the theological purposes of the Church;
- The pluralism of people’s views on diversity, which can be seen as new choices, increasing freedom or enriching culture.

In 1695, Locke published a text under the name *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (Locke: 1958: 1), which details some of those contained in the Letter. Although the philosophical concepts of Locke are strongly influenced by theology, in his texts we are seeing the future of the European political-philosophical tradition.

4. Immanuel Kant and ideas for “perpetual peace”

“The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality.”

We are speaking here, as in the previous articles, not of philanthropy, but of right; and in this sphere hospitality signifies the claim of a stranger entering foreign territory to be treated by its owner without hostility. The latter may send him away again if this can be done without causing his death; but, so long as he conducts himself peaceably, he must not be treated as an enemy. It is not a right to be treated as a guest to which the stranger can lay claim—a special friendly compact on his behalf would be required to make him for a given time an actual inmate—but he has a right of visitation. This right to present themselves to society belongs to all mankind in virtue of our common right of possession of the surface of the earth on which, as it is a globe, we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile ourselves to existence side by side: at the same time, originally no one individual had more right than another to live in any one particular spot.”

Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace*

The problem of perpetual peace as an aspect of cosmopolitanism, as it has already become clear, it has its pre-history. But publishing in 1795 his treatise *Perpetual Peace Project and the Project of the European Union* (Kant, 1958: 24), Kant for the first time considered the idea of perpetual peace as a major philosophical problem. So he provokes the interest again on this subject. Kant views the idea of perpetual peace as a priori in its essence, governing the relations of citizens in the state, of their countries, as well as the relations of citizens in a global world.

The idea of perpetual peace has its pre-history in Kant. Along with the article *The Idea of a Global History from a World-Civic Perspective*, in another work in 1784, Kant has perceptions of peace, of a peace as alliance between countries to which states will reach the pure natural necessity in order to preserve their own existence. According to Kant, the natural course of natural laws is that people will have to stop fighting among themselves and will be forced to finally unite in a great alliance of peoples.

In his article *Three Allegations of the Beginning of Human History* from 1786 (Vorländer, 1924: 59), Kant writes that, in fact, in the past there was a lot of meaning in the wars, even though they led to destruction and human sacrifice. They are the ones that awaken respect for their own people in their heads of state. This respect will be the impulse to seek ways to build a unified state in which everlasting peace exists.

In the same cosmopolitan and globalist spirit are ideas in another Kant's work from 1793. In *Society* Kant says: “This may be true in theory, but not in practice” (Kant, 1974: 46). Kant writes that the agony of persistent wars in which states are constantly trying to separate a piece of land from one another in an attempt to obey will eventually lead to their attempt to unite in a cosmopolitan arrangement that is subordinate to general legislation or by international law. Kant brings these ideas into “Perpetual Peace” (Kant, 1983: 3), with the book itself structured as a project for a peace treaty. The other urge that Kant to write this work is his closely monitored events on the end of the war and the peace talks between Prussia and France.

Only assumptions can be made of a connection between this peace and the writing of the book, even more so that Kant himself does not tell anywhere how he came to think of it, what made him develop the idea of perpetual peace and a particular essay.

The problem of perpetual peace was examined before Kant by Abbe Charles Irene de St Pierre (1658-1743) in his book *Projet de paix perpetuelle entre les potentats de L` Europe*. Published in 1713, book was greeted with great interest by the scholars of its time and was translated for a short time in almost all European languages. Then Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and philanthropists dealt with this problem. Particular attention is paid to Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744-1803), who has caused great interest in his thoughts on perpetual peace. For that the idea of perpetual peace has become very popular and it is testified by many peace-keeping societies and congresses in which scientists, statesmen and politicians have been most actively involved. Many articles have been published in journals and separate books in which questions were discussed in connection with the clarification and implementation of the idea of perpetual peace.

In such an environment in Europe appears the work of Kant “Perpetual Peace”, which very quickly conquers the minds of all who have been interested in the already popular idea of perpetual peace, because with the philosophical development of the basic issues of war and peace, it was totally different from everything that was said and written so far.

The first edition of “Perpetual Peace” came out in 1795 and was completely exhausted in just a few weeks. As the book continues to be searched, this edition has been reprinted and released for the second time that same year. Due to the great interest in 1796 a new supplemented edition appeared. The supplement consisted of a second addition to the already existing supplement in the first edition: “A secret member to perpetual peace”. In addition to these editions, in 1796 a French edition appeared in the same publishing house, which also took care of the first and second editions. There were two more editions in Kant’s life, in 1796 and 1797, which were copies of the first edition from 1795. Also, a copy of the manuscript of “Perpetual Peace” appeared, reviewed and supplemented by Kant himself with several remarks and supplements on the page field. The particularities of Kant’s language and style are preserved in “Perpetual Peace,” though not so high as in the three Critiques.

As a layout the book, “Perpetual Peace” is divided by Kant into two applications, two sections and two additions. The main part is developed in the form of a peace treaty, which gives some international law character to the thoughts set out. In the six preliminary members of the eternal peace between the countries with which the exhibition begins, Kant deals only with practical issues that basically do not differ much from the issues that determine the spirit and a number of modern peace treaties. He does not neglect the in-depth theoretical analysis to satisfy some current or imaginary application requirements, and does not underestimate the requirements of practice to stay in the higher spheres of pure philosophy. The same applies to the next three definitive members of eternal peace, in which Kant deals more closely with the right of the citizens of the state, with federalism as the basis of international law and with the right of the citizens of the world state. After the nine members of the eternal peace, two follow-ups and one application follow. Supplements, especially the first, mostly reflect Kant’s teachings of eternal peace as an integral part of his philosophy of history. The first supplement deals with the question of the boundaries of perpetual peace by developing the concept of a universal history from a philosophical-historical point of view. The second supplement contains criticism of the secret members of perpetual peace in general, emphasizing the importance of philosophers’ opinion on warfare and peace. The essay ends with an appendix that examines and clarifies the relationship between morality and politics in view of perpetual peace. The first part takes into account the reasons that prevent consistency between them, thus determining the irreconcilable controversy between morality and politics. The second part sets out the way in which this dispute can be

overcome and thus bring about consistency between them. This way, Kant defines the transcendental concept of public law.

As can be understood, in this work Kant develops the idea of perpetual peace in a doctrine of perpetual peace. The fact that he wrote and published his book in 1795 when the Basel Peace was concluded cannot define it as a random study, such as philosophical reflections on war and peace, which only intertwined him without any serious connection with the fundamental and other philosophical works. For Kant, the eternal peace that was supposed to follow the so-called peace treaties is not an empty idea, but a duty, and therefore a moral task that can only be solved on the basis of universal legislation, a common and binding public law, which will govern the relations of the citizens in the state, the relations of the states between them and the relations of the citizens in a world state.

Kant's theory requires reconciliation between politics and morality. There are two possibilities for this aim. To this end, there are two possibilities: either politics to obey morality; or morals to rest on politics. Kant, however, is well aware that both are almost completely unreadable and speaks of "perpetual peace" as something utopian. Still, this theory remains forever in the history of philosophy and becomes an ideal to which humanity seeks, even after a clear realization of its unattainability. The doctrine of perpetual peace by Kant is an integral part of his entire theoretical and practical philosophy and, in particular, his philosophy of history. In "Perpetual Peace," the great philosopher, for the first time in the history of human thought, views the idea of perpetual peace as a philosophical problem. In connection with this idea are his thoughts about the right of the citizens of the state, about the international law and about the right of the citizens of the world, which he thinks constitutes the content of his philosophical policy. Kant's "Perpetual Peace", which was supposed to follow the so-called peace treaties, is not an empty idea, but a duty and therefore a moral task for politicians and statesmen, which can only be solved on the basis of a universal law governing the relations of citizens in the state, the relations of the states between them and the relations of the citizens in a world state as a union of the states.

5. Conclusion

The works of Locke and Kant are the basis of the American Constitution and the Declaration of Independence (Skousen, 2016: 5), as well as the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom (Peterson, 2015: 3), written by Thomas Jefferson and underpinned by the American Constitution. Many of their ideas are contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Declaration of the Principles of Tolerance, etc. And in turn, the works of Locke and Kant guarantee the peaceful coexistence and the dignity of man, guarantee certain principles without which it would be inconceivable to "soften" some of the negatives of modern globalization.

6. General conclusions

How to live with the *Other* without any problems or contradictions? How does someone accept the Other – its religion, customs, culture without problems, and conflicts? Of course, the most tolerant is living on either side of a clearly marked line, but ...

The idea of tolerance in both John Locke and Immanuel Kant is – to be able to accept the Other as it is. Against the backdrop of the globalizing world and all the challenges that arise from this process that lead to the demolition of many of the boundaries typical of traditional societies, but also lead to the destruction of borders to the dangers of compelling modern human, placing him in a situation, living in a society labeled with a global risk. The idea that people living in Europe (and/or the greater part of the world), today after two world wars and a gradual global liberal democracy, are reasonable enough and is often refuted.

Today we do not stop talking about pluralistic social spaces, civil society, modern democracies, but we often forget that in 1933 Adolf Hitler came to power, precisely through democratic elections. Today, with extreme we see factors, ideological waves and political factions, pushing for sharp manifestations of antisemitism, xenophobia, chauvinism, racism, sociopathism, etc. Tolerance – it is today one of the most problematic themes.

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