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2026 - Volume 10 - Number 1

Epistemology as a Theory of Justification: A Critical Analysis of John Kekes’ Project

Olusola Ayomide Asaju * ORCID: 0009-0000-5887-5617
Obafemi Awolowo University, Faculty of Art, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA

Open Journal for Studies in Philosophy, 2026, 10(1), 23-32 * https://doi.org/10.32591/coas.ojsp.1001.03023a
Received: 23 November 2025 ▪ Revised: 31 March 2026 ▪ Accepted: 21 April 2026

LICENCE: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

ARTICLE (Full Text - PDF)

ABSTRACT:
There are a lot of issues that we need to provide solutions to in Epistemology as a branch of philosophy. In contemporary philosophy there are issues that demands answers such as the nature and theories of epistemic justification, the basal input of doubt about knowledge claim its possibility and implausibility (skepticism), the issues of perception in epistemology, should epistemic justification be internal or external among others. In recent trends in the development of epistemology is the philosophical debate on reasoning, epistemic judgement, a priori, posteriori, introspection, memory and so on. These issues are vital to epistemologist and many scholars have responded to it. Among this epistemologist is John Kekes, a renowned scholar in contemporary epistemological discourse. This paper is a look into Kekes view on these issues and some of the philosophical issues in epistemology and then an appraisal of some of the problem he identified in contemporary epistemology is provided.

KEY WORDS: skepticism, epistemic issues, foundationalism, fallibilism, rationality.

CORRESPONDING AUTHOR:
Olusola Ayomide Asaju, Obafemi Awolowo University, Faculty of Art, Department of Philosophy, Ile-Ife, NIGERIA.

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