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The Culture of Peace on the International Scene According to the Work of Elise Boulding: Notes to Read the Book *The Culture of Peace: The Hidden Face of History*

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Abstract

This article is an analysis of the construction of a culture of peace by the works of Elise Boulding. Indeed, it is up to a biography of the author as well as part of his bibliography, thus emphasizing his contributions in the epistemology of crises and conflicts. On the other hand, the article emerges the implications of Elise Boulding in the construction of a culture of peace on the international scene. Thus, the work uses the source cite and cross-analysis of the documents left by this author on the one hand, and by other authors on the other.

Keywords: conflicts, peace culture, Elise Boulding, conflict resolution, peace, international scene.

1. Introduction

International reflections can be explained on the basis of theories. The world in the aftermath of the Cold War engages in a process of international pacification supported by experts and researchers. It is in this logic that Elise Boulding, who will later be considered as the “Mother of Peace Studies,” she militates for the development of a culture of peace. Therefore, the problem underlying our subject is that of the influence of the theory and work of Elise Boulding in the process of conflict resolution and peace promotion on the international scene. In this production of “The Culture of Peace” recognized by UNESCO, Elise Boulding is trying to present its theory as to the management of crises and wars on the international scene. Thus, it is appropriate to wonder who is Elise Boulding and what is the influence of its work in the process of prevention and conflict resolution on the international scene? To answer this question, we organized our research according to a bipartite plan namely the life of Elise and its commitment in the fight for international peace on the one hand, and the influence of its work in the process of prevention and conflict resolution on the international scene passing through a proposal for measures variously shared preventive.

2. Biography and beginning of Elise Boulding's peace quest

Many elements of Elise Boulding's life influenced its interest in conflict resolution and the promotion of a culture of peace.

2.1 *Biography*

Elise Born-Hanser was born in Oslo in Norway on July 06, 1920. In 1923 his family and she moved to the United States following the First World War and the invasion of Norway in prelude to the Second World War. These events convinced Born-Hanser that life through the years of wars and the resulting violence was not an answer if not adequate to the problem since even his native country was preyed. It therefore engaging in its youth in anti-wars converted activities in historical peace church named the religious society of friends of (Quakers). It was at a meeting of the Quakers held in May 1941 that she met Kenneth Boulding (1910-1993), an English economist who, fascinated by the ambitions of the lady, began to help him discreetly in his work of peace and with who they marry. They had five children and that did not stop excise Boulding to fully engage in an activist fight for a promotion of international peace. Professor Emeritus of Sociology in Dartmouth College, Elise Born-Hanser Boulding was also part of the Faculty of the United Nations University, the International Peace Prize Jury awarded by UNESCO, and the Congress Commission American who leads to the Foundation of the Institute for Peace. She died in 2010 in the USA.

2.2 *An active life in the perpetual quest for international peace*

Fervent believing in community life, family unity, the role of women within this unity and their crucial aspect for the development of a real international peace.

After working at the Iowa State College (where she had obtained his degree in sociology, and at the University of Colorado, she and Kenneth were invited to become a researchers in residence at Dartmouth College where she developed the basis of a sociology turned to "peace studies." Following his hard work, the institution greatly accredits its "peace studies" by erecting them at the academic level.

Boulding has held many management positions in groups related to peace and social justice namely the presidency of the International League of Women for Peace and Freedom (Wilph) (UNESCO, 2010). She died in 2010 being already emeritus professor in sociology. Full of twists, the active life of Elise combines both science, passion and faith. It is therefore logical to suspect that religion has had a significant impact on its activist ambitions and acts.

The author reviews a connection between the family, the international community and governments by offering prospects and warning on the lines on the line to follow or walk to access peace. By its work, the author shows the importance of peace on the international scene and within states. The author continues its remarks by defining the notion of "culture of peace" as this education to live together between peoples. According to it, this "culture of peace" would be the essential means of preventing and avoiding clashes on the international scene. The general idea is the setting up of this "culture of peace". Indeed, the author also develops a form of warning on the dangers of conflict as well as its consequences particularly on the vulnerable layers of the company namely women, children etc. the author continues its remarks by signifying these few warnings that would avoid the disaster with emphasis on the preventive aspect of the problem.

Be sure E. Bouling strives to highlight the obscured aspect of a "peaceful international life" is characterized by the establishment of the inadequate procedures to crisis management.

Little by little the work of Elise Boulding will affect the international scene based on the family model of life and the protection of vulnerable layers with the support of international organizations.

3. The influence of the work of Elise Boulding in the process of pacification and conflict resolution on the international scene

The work of Elise Boulding on conflict prevention strongly influenced the sphere of international relations. Indeed, we see how much it has oriented its research and mobilized in the search for the means of resolution of the different internationals because of their impact on society.

3.1 The protection of vulnerable layers and the interpellation of international structures

Elise Boulding's actions are noted by the International Society. Indeed, it was solicited by the United Nations and will gradually be considered the "mother of peace" by its daily interventions and actions.

In his militant life, she is the importance of women in the process of packing of the planet and the need to prepare a better future generation. In one of his dialogs with Daisakou Ikeda (2014), she talks about a "development of a culture of peace." It's a way for it a way to use in order to avoid the bursting of more complex conflicts, which would then be more difficult to manage. For her, it would be necessary to anticipate the question that is even more cried in children, then more exposed to the adverse effects of the conflict.

Indeed, in these same dialogues, Elise Boulding evoked the "primordial role of women in the creation of a culture of peace." Moreover, a plethora of proposals is made according to the theory of Elise Boulding in order to build a real and solid culture of the Pax on the international scene.

In general, the culture of peace on the international scene necessarily involves the management of social issues. For her it is precisely in the social fact that the conflict was born and, it is only in the same social fact that he can end. Much more than a utopian vision, the realism that emerges from the work of Elise Boulding seems obvious to the extent that they seek, by common social facts in the world, to settle and avoid the various international crises. This is undoubtedly for this reason that its work is to cause thoughts on the processes of international conflict resolutions; these processes with a considerable link with the promotion and education of a culture of peace and to expose the "hidden face of history" international.

3.2 Some international peace programs proposed by the theory of Elise Boulding and their influence on the international scene

In order to promote post-conflict prevention, resolutions and post-conflict care on the international scene, Elise Boulding and other researchers have proposed possible measures.

In a first time Vick Ikobwa (2005), who thinks that education would be "an essential element in the post-conflict prevention and management process". The protection of vulnerable layers to know women and children would allow better pacification of the international scene. It would therefore be necessary to carry out a better social integration. Integration into school curricula from the "Elementary" level of peace cultures and dispute resolution would also allow the long-term to avoid the outbreak of new conflicts on the international scene. Encourage young

people and introduce them to dialogue, protect them from begging and poverty by proposing them better living conditions to limit wars as the majority of wars in Africa or in the near and the Middle East are conducted by “CHILD Soldiers.” In addition, it would be necessary to help and support these vulnerable layers including women and children and in particular girls often victims of sexual abuse to deal with the trauma that accompany their respective experiences.

Pioneer in the field of international peace, Elise Boulding proposes by his theory of peace culture a panoply of methods contributing to resolve definitively conflicts by at least the sequelae they leave in women and children (Clear, 2010). It should be remembered, however, that Elise Boulding’s proposals and theory of conflict resolution and post-conflict care have long been ignored and it is only after multiple attempts and insistence to the United Nations it was taken into account and its work has been taken into account. Visa many Nobels and peace prices. It is possible for Boulding, an internationally based international life, has the contrary of the realistic vision that thinks it essentially bellicker.

Indeed, it is a question of bringing this obscure face from international history by educating the reasons, the causes of conflict in order to provide adequate measures for resolution. By observing the contemporary international world, the importance of Boulding Elise work is gradually because the deep quest for historical truths of international life is engaged. The promotion of a true culture of peace is engaged and then finds all its meaning in a world of multiform and multiverse wars. This finding leads to the proposal and setting up the programs under cities.

4. Conclusion

It was ultimately the influence see the weight of the African continent in the UN Security Council. It is apparent from our work that Africa appears almost figuratively within the UNSC (United Nations Security Council) because not having a decision-making power if not a smaller and constantly stifled. In addition, Africa faces the problem of inter-African rivalries for a place at the CNSU as well as limitations due to the statutory provisions of the United Nations. This situation gives rise to the multiform demands of Africans who want to be heard and to be noticed within the world's most powerful organ. Africa therefore occupies an unexpected place within the UNSC and is constantly struggling for the change.

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Do China's Investments and Aid in Africa Constitute a Form of Neo-Colonialism?

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Abstract

This essay argues that China's investments and aid in Africa do not constitute neocolonialism. Grounded in the Three Worlds Theory established after 1949, China's foreign policy has, since 2012, emphasized developing nations, particularly in Africa, as a cornerstone of its Global South strategy. Post-2012, Chinese investments have primarily focused on infrastructure and production sectors. Western accusations of neocolonialism, environmental damage, and debt crises lack substantial evidence and often reflect self-projection. These criticisms overlook China's recent efforts in green investments and its policy of non-interference, which contrasts with Western approaches. Methodologically, the essay analyses China's strategy using Chinese government documents, leadership speeches, and data from international organizations. The findings suggest that China's investments aim at win-win outcomes, fostering infrastructure, employment, and education in Africa. While criticism persists, China's engagement reflects a pragmatic approach that contributes to African development and economic growth.

Keywords: China, foreign investment, Africa, neo-colonialism.

1. Introduction

China has recently become a significant trade partner for several African countries. Trade between Africa and China (import and export of goods) has grown significantly, with the total amount increasing from \$11.67 billion in 2000 to a peak of \$257.67 billion in 2022, surpassing both the United Kingdom and the United States (Boston University, 2024). However, there have been concerns regarding whether China's investments and aid in Africa constitute a form of neocolonialism. Neocolonialism refers to the practice of powerful nations using economic imperialism, globalization, cultural imperialism, and conditional aid to influence or even control developing countries (Udegbonam, 2020). This essay argues that China's aid and investment in Africa do not constitute neocolonialism. The first part of the essay will review, from a historical perspective, the characteristics of the People's Republic of China's (PRC 中华人民共和国) policies towards developing countries since its establishment in 1949 and in recent years. The essay will also explore the new characteristics of China's recent foreign investments and aid and the allegations of neocolonialism associated with China's activities in Africa. The third part of the essay will discuss the arguments against the notion that China's aid and investment in Africa

amount to neocolonialism. Finally, the essay will conclude based on the discussions presented in the previous sections.

2. The main body

2.1 *China's foreign policy towards Africa: Historical roots and contemporary strategies*

China's foreign policy towards Africa is derived from the Three Worlds Theory (*San'ge shijie lilun* 三个世界理论), which emerged after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. At the end of 1949, when the nascent was founded, China adopted a foreign policy of "lean on one side" (*Yi bian dao* 一边倒) by signing the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance (*Zhongsu youhao huzhu tongmeng tiaoyue* 中苏友好同盟互助条约) with the Soviet Union in early 1950, joining the Soviet-led socialist camp (Zhang, 2021). Concurrently, to develop diplomatic relations with newly independent nations, the Chinese government dispatched Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898-1976) to attend the Bandung Conference 1955 (Wright, 2020). The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (*Heping gongchu wuxiang yuanze* 和平共处五项原则), which include mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, became the guiding principles of China's foreign policy¹ (Chen, 2018).

Based on the Bandung Spirit (*Wanlong jingshen* 萬隆精神) of "solidarity, friendship, and cooperation,"² Mao Zedong proposed the Three Worlds Theory in the 1970s (Deng, 2017). In this theory, the Third World refers to China, other developing countries, and undeveloped nations in Asia, Africa, Latin America, and other regions. According to the Three Worlds Theory, China increased its investment in Africa. In 1975 alone, China's foreign investment and aid accounted for 5% of its GDP (Lowell, 2019). One of the most notable projects was the TAZARA Railway, which runs from Tanzania in the east to Zambia in the west, covering 1,860 kilometers (Li, 2016). China's investments in Africa yielded significant returns. On October 25, 1971, the 26th session of the United Nations (UN 聯合國) General Assembly voted and passed the resolution to restore the lawful rights of the PRC in the UN (UN, 1971). Mao Zedong 毛澤東 (1893-1976) remarked, "It is our African brothers who have carried us into the UN"³ (Xinhua, 1971). This demonstrates the long-standing history of cooperation between China and Africa.

Since 2012, China has further advanced its Global South strategy. Following the reform and opening-up policy (*Gai'ge kaifang* 改革開放) in 1978, China's foreign policy has regarded developing countries, such as those in Africa, as its foundation (Chen, 2019). Around 2000, the Chinese government established a diplomatic framework: "major powers are key, neighboring countries are the priority, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateral

¹ "互相尊重主权和领土完整、互不侵犯、互不干涉内政、平等互利、和平共处"。Chen, Y. (2018). The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and Their Impact on China's Foreign Policy. *Asian Studies Review*, 42(4), 678–693.

² "團結、友誼、合作"。Cho, H. Y. (2015). Revitalising the Bandung spirit. In *The Inter-Asia Cultural Studies Reader* (pp. 578–591). Routledge.

³ "非洲黑人兄弟把我們擡進聯合國"。Bai, Meng Chen. 白孟宸 (2018). *Bei feizhouxiongdi taijin lianheguo* : zhongfei waijiao dailai de zhongguo xuanfeng 被非洲兄弟擡進聯合國: 中非外交帶來的中國旋風. (Carried into the UN by African brothers: the Chinese whirlwind of China-Africa diplomacy. Times-Picayune, 17.

platforms are an important stage”⁴ (Zhou, 2001). Meanwhile, after the expiry of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance, and Mutual Assistance in 1980, the Chinese government adopted a non-alignment policy, emphasising “dialogue without confrontation and partnerships without alliances”⁵ (Wang, 2005).

In the context of Sino-African relations, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC 中非合作論壇) has become an essential platform for summit diplomacy between China and Africa (FOCAC, 2009). According to official Chinese views, the forum is based on “political equality and mutual trust, economic cooperation and mutual benefit, and cultural exchange”⁶ (FOCAC, 2009). Besides the China-Africa Economic and Trade Forum, the recent expansion of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS 金磚五國) has also targeted Global South countries. In 2023, BRICS welcomed countries like Egypt and Ethiopia into the alliance (BRICS, 2023). Recently, China has asserted that “China will always stay connected with African countries, share a common destiny, and forever remain good friends, good partners, and good brothers of Africa”⁷ (Xi, 2023). This demonstrates that, with the growth of China’s economic power, developing countries like those in Africa have consistently been the cornerstone of China’s foreign policy (Li, 2023).

2.2 China's modern investment strategies in Africa: Infrastructure development and emerging controversies

Since 2012, China’s investment and aid in Africa have primarily focused on infrastructure and production sectors. In 2015, for the first time, China’s outbound investment surpassed its domestic investment (Johnston, 2019). The Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, known collectively as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI 一帶一路倡議), were proposed and are led by the Chinese government since 2013, involving investments in nearly 70 countries and international organisations (Jackson & Shepotylo, 2021). As one of the most significant continents participating in the BRI, by June 2023, 52 African countries and the African Union Commission had jointly signed cooperation documents with China to build the BRI. China has established capacity cooperation mechanisms with 15 African countries, and Chinese enterprises have been involved in planning, constructing, and operating over 50 industrial parks across African nations (Xinhua Net, 2023).

Simultaneously, China has integrated its infrastructure-focused BRI with Africa’s infrastructure development plans. For instance, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA 非洲基礎設施發展計劃) primarily targets African nations, aiming to mobilize resources to transform Africa with modern infrastructure. PIDA’s cross-border infrastructure projects and programs cover four major sectors: energy, transport, transboundary water resources, and information and communication technology (African Development Bank, 2019). By the third quarter of 2023, China’s investment and financing in Africa had exceeded \$31 billion,

⁴ “大國是關鍵、周邊是首要、發展中國家是基礎、多邊是重要舞臺”。Zhou, E. (2001). The Evolution of China's Foreign Policy. *Journal of International Relations*, 5(2), 45–67.

⁵ “對話不對抗，結伴不結盟” Ma, Chunhong 馬純紅. (2018). Duihua xieshang : goujian renlei mingyun gongtongti de neihe yu tezhi 對話協商：構建人類命運共同體的內核與特質 (Dialogue and consultation: the kernel and qualities of building a community of human destiny). *Journal of Jishou University* (Social Science Edition), 39(3), 10.

⁶ “政治上平等互信、經濟上合作共贏、文化上交流互鑒”。FOCAC. (2009). Forum on China-Africa Cooperation: Progress Report.

⁷ “中國將始終同非洲國家心連心、共命運，永遠做非洲的好朋友、好夥伴、好兄弟”。Xi Jinping 習近平. (2023). Speech at the BRICS Summit. *Xinhua News Agency*.

with investment projects encompassing various infrastructure endeavors (Office of the Leading Group for Promoting the Construction of the BRI, 2023). This indicates the continuous expansion of China's infrastructure investments, complementing African local infrastructure projects.

Regarding China's expanding infrastructure investments and aid in Africa, there have been various allegations from Western countries and international public opinion about China engaging in "neocolonialism" and "resource and energy plundering." Neocolonialism refers to the practice post-1945, where significant powers use economic imperialism, globalization, cultural imperialism, and conditional aid to influence or control developing countries rather than directly occupying them militarily. Dependency theory has been a primary theoretical basis for these allegations (Gassama, 2008). Dependency theory, a neo-Marxist theory, divides the world into advanced core countries and less developed peripheral countries; due to the structural imbalance of international capitalism, core countries exploit peripheral countries, resulting in a lack of development or issues like corruption (Hays, 1964).

Sino-African relations have accelerated rapidly over the past two decades, with a significant increase in bilateral trade volume, and China has become Africa's largest trading partner. Allegations of neocolonialism by China in Africa are prevalent in Western academia. The first accusation pertains to environmental degradation. Some scholars argue that China's emphasis on extracting natural resources such as oil, minerals, and timber reflects historical colonial practices, leading to economic dependency and environmental degradation in African countries (Jiang, 2009). Additionally, the substantial loans provided by China for infrastructure projects have raised concerns about "debt-trap diplomacy (*Zhaiwu waijiao* 債務外交)" (Wang & Xu, 2023). Critics claim that some African countries incur high levels of debt, and if they fail to repay, they may lose sovereignty, allowing China to control critical assets or strategic sectors (Onjala, 2018).

China's foreign direct investment (FDI 外商直接投資) has also grown significantly over the past decade, making China the world's third-largest source of FDI from 2000 to 2015 (Lee, 2018). Some scholars contend that China weaponises its FDI to impose political conditions on African countries, as evidenced by China's alleged neocolonialism in Africa (Carrai, 2020). Therefore, the main criticisms of China's infrastructure investments and aid in Africa focus on environmental damage, debt crises resulting from Chinese infrastructure investments, and the political conditions attached to Chinese aid, including the resource exploitation resulting from China's FDI.

2.3 Debunking the neocolonialism narrative: China's evolving role and green investments in Africa

The Western countries' accusations of Chinese neocolonialism in Africa can, to some extent, be viewed as a form of self-projection. Historically, Western nations accumulated wealth through forced labor and the slave trade in the 19th century and their colonial rule and racist policies in the 20th century were significant contributors to Africa's poverty and underdevelopment (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2010). The accusations that China is attempting to control African countries through so-called "debt diplomacy" are mainly unfounded. Statistics show that between 2001 and 2017, China restructured or cancelled loans for 51 debtor nations without seizing their state-owned assets. Moreover, compared to the US-led World Bank, China offers better financing rates (The Center for Global Development, 2018).

Regarding the allegations of Chinese neocolonialism, African perceptions of China's diplomatic policies on the continent are generally more favorable than critics acknowledge. However, these perceptions might not be as positive as the Chinese government would hope (Sautman & Yan, 2009). Furthermore, the claim that China's FDI in Africa is aimed at resource

plundering is inaccurate. China's FDI flows into high-income economies rather than developing countries (Sun et al., 2023). Thus, the narrative of Chinese neocolonialism in Africa lacks a factual basis.

Additionally, the accusations that Chinese infrastructure investments in Africa lead to environmental degradation ignore recent initiatives by China concerning overseas green investments. With the global implementation of the BRI, China's demand for oil, natural gas, food, minerals, and sand has risen (Liu, 2019). Chinese companies' overseas expansion has indeed caused environmental damage and community opposition like that caused by Western companies (Chan-Fishel et al., 2007). However, in 2021, Chinese leaders announced that China would not build any new coal-fired power projects abroad and would significantly support green and low-carbon energy development in developing countries (Xi, 2021). Western scholars also recognize that Chinese investments contribute to socioeconomic development (Chan-Fishel et al., 2007). Moreover, China's investments in Africa are becoming increasingly diversified, extending beyond resource extraction to include manufacturing, telecommunications, and financial services, thus contributing to some African countries' economic diversification and industrialization (Xia & Chen, 2023). As global climate action accelerates, China is expected to shift the BRI towards energy transition cooperation, renewable energy investment, and green low-carbon industry investment starting in 2023 (Tang et al., 2024). This indicates a continual shift towards green investments in China's infrastructure projects in Africa.

Finally, the claim that China uses its infrastructure investments to impose political conditions on recipient countries overlooks China's long-standing foreign policy. China's official policy of non-interference in internal affairs is perceived as respecting the sovereignty of African nations, in stark contrast to Western conditional aid, which often requires political and economic reforms in the recipient countries (Trehubova, 2023). The paternalistic model of Western engagement with Africa has yielded limited success, whereas China's mercantilist and business-oriented approach has at least provided infrastructure, employment, and educational opportunities for Africans (Rich & Recker, 2013). China's drive for infrastructure development in Africa is motivated by domestic economic considerations. Chinese enterprises are no longer merely seeking resources abroad. However, they employ a "going out" (*Zouchuqu* 走出去) strategy across entire industrial chains to find new growth points in the global market, leveraging their scale advantages to drive domestic economic development (Nye, 2023). Thus, the "Going Out" strategy, which became a national policy in 2000, seeks to create new markets for China's stagnant domestic economy, ultimately achieving a 'win-win' situation for both China and the recipient countries.

3. Conclusion

This essay argues that China's investments and aid in Africa do not constitute a form of neocolonialism. China's foreign policy towards Africa derives from the Three Worlds Theory, established following the founding of the PRC in 1949. Since 2012, China has further advanced its Global South strategy, consistently positioning developing countries like those in Africa as the cornerstone of its foreign policy. Post-2012, China's investments and aid in Africa have primarily focused on infrastructure and production sectors.

Regarding China's expanding infrastructure projects and aid in Africa, Western nations and international public opinion have made various allegations about China engaging in "neocolonialism" and "resource and energy plundering." These accusations mainly focus on the environmental damage caused by Chinese activities in Africa, debt crises resulting from Chinese infrastructure investments and the political conditions allegedly attached to Chinese aid, including resource exploitation through China's FDI.

The Western countries' accusations of Chinese neocolonialism in Africa can, to some extent, be seen as a form of self-projection and lack sufficient factual basis. Additionally, the accusations of environmental damage caused by China's infrastructure investments in Africa ignore recent initiatives by China regarding overseas green investments. China's approach contrasts with Western models by emphasising non-interference in domestic affairs and fostering genuine partnerships rather than imposing political conditions. This strategy, motivated by domestic economic considerations and the "going out" policy, aims to create a win-win scenario for both China and African nations, promoting infrastructure development, employment, and educational opportunities. In conclusion, while criticisms persist, China's foreign policy and investment strategies in Africa reflect a complex interplay of historical ties, economic pragmatism, and evolving global ambitions, ultimately contributing to the continent's development and China's economic growth.

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The Contribution of Bazil Bernstein's Concept of Symbolic Control to the Understanding of Social Control and the Role of Social Sciences in Contemporary Societies

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Abstract

Processes of social control that maintain patterns of regular thinking and behavior have long been integral to sociological explanations of the formation of social reality. However, Bernstein's concept of symbolic control highlights a specific dimension of social control by linking sociolinguistic codes in pedagogical communication with power relations and the formation of consciousness. The roles of education and science are pivotal in the division of labor and the mechanisms of symbolic control. Social sciences contribute to the construction of social reality and simultaneously constitute themselves as part of this reality by shaping categories of people who become their subjects of study. Exploring the organic connections among sciences, education, and the social regulation of thoughts and emotions can reveal the potential usefulness of each body of knowledge beyond the conditions of domination that obscure certain aspects of human existence while emphasizing others.

Keywords: symbolic control, Bernstein, education, domination.

1. Introduction

Despite, or perhaps because of, deviations from rules, social control ensures that a pattern of regular thinking and acting can be maintained. Whether social rules are being followed or contested, consolidated or changed, people usually have a sense of what is considered normal or natural in any given social context. Normality is produced by communication, language and knowledge, in part, by specialized discourses produced by sciences, especially social sciences. Understanding the contribution of symbolic systems connected to sciences to this objectively observable yet subjectively experienced regularity poses a significant sociological question.

Central to this discussion is Bernstein's concept of symbolic control (2003b) linking sociolinguistic codes of pedagogical communication with power relations and the formation of consciousness defined as part of his analysis of a social division of labor in which a field of professions that regulate the mind, body, and social relations was developed. Starting from Durkheim's classical concept of social control (1984), we are unfolding a pathway coming through theories explaining the normative function of knowledge, science and education. This pathway leads to a reconsideration of Bernstein's concept of symbolic control, especially with respect to Bourdieu's concept of symbolic domination (1991).

- Normality is produced by communication, language and knowledge, in part, by specialized discourses produced by sciences, especially social sciences.
- Bernstein's concept of symbolic control is linking sociolinguistic codes of pedagogical communication with power relations and the formation of consciousness.
- Symbolic control refers to socialization as self-restraint achieved through the manipulation of symbols.

Symbolic control refers to socialization as self-restraint achieved through the manipulation of symbols, especially in the form of knowledge, rather than other disciplinary mechanisms of social control. The roles of education and science are pivotal for the division of labor and the processes of symbolic control. While symbolic control focuses on appropriate forms of communication for different social groups, symbolic domination focuses on the power that creates and reinforces boundaries between social categories, groups, and discourses. The legitimizing functions of the field of symbolic control are discussed, along with consequences of current structural transformations. This theoretical framework offers a perspective on how sciences, especially social sciences, contribute to the constitution of social reality by shaping categories of people who become their subjects of study and, at the same time, constitute themselves as part of this reality.

Of course, the sciences are merely one of the sources of mental frameworks that constitute reality at a given moment in the development of the division of labor. On the other hand, in each historical period, both the social sciences and the others with which they communicate possess a reservoir of knowledge that is not exhausted by the needs of population management. Ultimately, we would say that the social sciences and the social reality they study develop through a dialectical relationship of dependence. The knowledge of the social sciences about behavior contributes to the categorization of thought both for social reality and for themselves, while policies solidify the categorizations that delineate social reality into institutions, thus resulting in a new social reality in which new behaviors emerge, which also become objects of scientific explanations, categorizations, institutionalizations, and so on.

2. Social control, discipline and social order

Classical sociological and philosophical theories on modern societies provide numerous insights into the structural conditions that have led to transformations of social control established within the broader context of historical processes such as capitalism, bureaucracy, and urbanization. Karl Marx highlighted the disciplinary impacts of factory labor and the commodification of labor itself. Georg Simmel examined how personalities adjusted to the demands of an urban capitalist environment, emphasizing traits like punctuality, calculability, and exactness. Max Weber discussed the changes in subjectivity linked to ascetic Protestantism, which played a crucial role in the development of Western capitalism (Van Krieken, 1990). All these perspectives can be seen as expressions of the disciplinary aspect present in the organizational settings of living and working in modern societies producing normality.

Foucault (1982) has analyzed the normativity of knowledge through a conceptual conjunction of power, knowledge, and subjectivity. Power, as defined by Foucault (1982), constitutes a set of actions upon possible actions. It does not have holders and non-holders but exists as a chain between subject-object positions embedded within social relations, delineating the boundaries of individual freedom of thought and action. Power is not imposed from above by a central authority, but is synthesised within the multiplicity of social relations, crystallizing into various codifications within institutions and the state. Knowledge is intertwined with the ability

to form subjects who act upon others and is connected to the moral legitimacy provided by its “truth” (Foucault, 1979).

Derivative concepts include biopower and biopolitics, which Foucault connects to the application of science aimed at producing subjectivities. These concepts describe “governmentality,” which refers to the principles governing power relations, policies, disciplinary and regulatory programs implemented in governance. The goal is to shape and sustain not only economic subjectivities (classes) but also subjects of rights and social subjects within the population. The sciences play a crucial role in mediating the public sphere, public opinion, and the “human species” (or social categories) generated by these policies. They aid in normalizing behavior through two forms of social control: discipline, which establishes rules and prohibitions to limit behavior, and security, which encourages behaviors while allowing for differential management of norms and associated risks (Foucault, 2007).

In Foucault’s view, ideas dominate institutions, shaping a social reality that those who feel oppressed by it can only reject. Even then, however, the same subjects would be confronted with a new disciplinary regime, a new web of knowledge-power relations beyond their control, hoping only that it would be better than the previous one. Better, however, for whom? What are the criteria? These questions remain unanswered when every intervention in social reality is categorized under the same label as “power relations” without differentiation based on the interests, needs, and purposes of each intervention, without reference to the action of social groups formed by the division of social labor.

On the other hand, conceptions of power and knowledge in the form of dominant ideology do connect discipline with the interests of specific social groups, as exemplified by Althusser in his famous elaboration of the Marxian thesis. According to Althusser, the capitalist class’s domination, both mental and material, is reproduced by the “Repressive State Apparatus” (e.g. government, courts, police, and armed forces, etc.), primarily, but not exclusively, relying on force, and the “Ideological State Apparatuses” (e.g. religious, educational, familial, legal, political, and cultural institutions, etc.), primarily relying on persuasion. These two forms of power feed each other in social reality, which is both material and mental (Althusser, 1971). However, from this perspective, all practices and institutions of social control are categorized as instruments of class domination without differentiation regarding their specific function and impact on the balance of power between social groups. This approach leaves the matter of purposeful intervention in favor of the dominated classes to an unspecified future total subversion of social order.

While providing a comprehensive view of the interplay between external and internal restraint and motivation, both Foucault’s and Althusser’s theories of discipline do not fully support an analysis of the specific contexts. The thesis of the “dominant ideology” or the “knowledge-power web of relations” fails to consider the various ways in which different types of institutions, such as educational versus judicial, or even institutions of the same type, contribute to the power dynamics between social groups. Such an analysis would necessitate an exploration of the implications of the increasing importance of knowledge production and transmission in the division of social labor in modern societies for processes of social control.

3. Social control: Socialization achieved through self-restrain

The concept of social control refers to the means, processes, and agents through which people are conditioned by social values and norms. This can include being incited, encouraged, impelled, or forced, depending on the case, to adjust their thoughts and behaviors accordingly. Social control covers the same ground as the concept of “socialization,” which was widely used in the past but is somewhat marginalized today (Guhnin et al., 2021). However, social control refers

to a narrower field of definition. If we can distinguish between the transmission of societal or social group culture to the individual, resulting in behavioral adjustment or maladjustment, and the intentional set of practices (such as child-rearing practices, formal education, work organization, penal system mechanisms, etc.), then socialization refers to the former while social control refers to the latter. In a sense, socialization is the outcome of social control. However, in addition to various aspects of how social coexistence shapes the ways we think and act, the concept of social control also delineates the structural power relations that characterize the social world and exist beyond any individual or intra-individual experience.

In Durkheim's work (1984), we can find an anthropological foundation for the importance of social control in relation to socialization. He considered self-restraint to be a necessary condition for the existence of social life. According to Durkheim, an individual's self-restraint towards others and things is a prerequisite for recognizing the freedoms and boundaries of others' actions. However, this self-restraint is only activated when there are bonds and interdependencies between individuals or groups. Different forms of regulating social relations correspond to the two types of collective consciousness defined by Durkheim: mechanical and organic solidarity. In mechanical solidarity, moral rules arise from common feelings and beliefs that regulate behavior without being questioned by society or the group. In organic solidarity, social relations are regulated by law and contract, connecting the individual directly with the total society through the state and political power, and subsequently with other individuals. This simultaneously protects and liberates individuals from the power of the group. In modern societies, while mechanical solidarity still exists, a new form of collective consciousness is needed to ensure solidarity and social cohesion. This requires a new common belief and sentiment. Durkheim sees individualism, the "cult of the individual," as playing this crucial role. However, this is a moral individualism that does not focus on individuality but rather views the human being as a totality with needs and potentialities that depend on social relations for satisfaction and realization.

A prerequisite for achieving self-restraint as an individual is the social organization of emotions. This ensures that emotions like shame, guilt, fear (or conversely pride, etc.) play a role in regulating behavior within society. Socialization involves processes of formation that, according to Durkheim's theory (2005: 35-45), focus on the "dual nature" of humans. These processes connect the individual's physical presence and sensory experiences with the collective's impersonal concepts and moral norms. The outcome is the transition from a biological being to a unique cultural existence, achieved through social control of behavior.

Thus, self-restraint is an outcome of social constraints that form a specific "instinctual economy" in Elias's terminology (1978: 238), who coincides with Durkheim when he stresses that: "...it is the structure of society that requires and fosters a specific standard of affect-control" In his account of the "civilizing process" that took place in Western Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries, a shift to a new system of control is depicted. In societies lacking central authority to enforce restraint, instincts and emotions were expressed more openly and impulsively, leading to immediate action. However, contrasting societies began to emerge where the state monopolized physical violence, and a social hierarchy provided incentives such as status, career opportunities, power, or income to individuals who could restrain their immediate impulses in favor of long-term objectives. According to Elias, the "civilizing spurt" is related to this growth of state control and changes in the mode of control, such as the change from direct command and constraint to indirect methods of control, as well as the increasing, lengthening, differentiation, and stability of interdependence-chains binding individuals to each other (1978: 239). How knowledge, education and science contribute to the specific "instinctual economy" of our times, are questions that can be answered sociologically within the theoretical framework outlined below.

4. The production of knowledge: Science and the scientific establishments

Knowledge can be seen as a source of power, representing an imposition of force from an impersonal authority that exceeds individual and collective goals. It can also be understood as a relationship between cause and effect that can be intentionally regulated, creating numerous possibilities. As Elias (1991) describes it, knowledge is a network of human-made symbols that serve as tools for both orientation and communication. The production of knowledge is primarily driven by scientists, who are specialists providing their societies with the necessary tools for realistic and informed social practices. Elias argues that every member of society relies on the available means of orientation, and those who control the production, verification, and transmission of knowledge hold power. In his analysis on the formation of scientific establishments (Elias, 1982), he demonstrates that the professionalization of scientific work in the 19th and 20th centuries created new monopolies on means of orientation, alongside existing ones such as churches. European universities traditionally served dual roles as educational institutions and centers for research, advancing and passing on knowledge, both new and old, to future generations.

The establishments in the sciences, which produce and control distinct bodies of knowledge, developed depending on the cognitive value of the knowledge they produced. This development required autonomy in their relationships with other powerful groups. Specific types of science became the authoritative model for all other sciences by demonstrating their success and usefulness in terms of the goals of non-scientific establishments, political, and economic. The social organization of scientific-academic work is characterized by a trend towards increasing specialization, power and status differentials between the various specialized disciplines, and the tendency of scientific establishments to develop “professional ideologies” – beliefs about the special value of their work which sometimes cannot be separated from their products. Thus, the knowledge they produce serves simultaneously as a means of achieving power and status not only in the hierarchy of the scientific field but also in the larger state-society. This struggle for the achievement of power and status, or what Bourdieu has termed “symbolic domination” (1991) does not concern only groups of scientist. The way it represents a diffused reflection of struggles for power between social classes and it is imprinted in the production and transmission of knowledge, as well as social control processes, will be discussed later.

5. The transmission of knowledge: social control, division of labor and education

Of course, other educational institutions are essential for the creation of new knowledge by science. It is through these institutions that younger generations acquire the symbolic capacity that has been historically conquered and accumulated in society. In return, scientific knowledge produces specialized discourses that inform the processes, organization, and contents of cultural transmission that occur within educational institutions. Education can be seen as a process of cultural transmission, where symbolic capacity (or the sum of means of orientation and communication) is passed down from older to younger generations. This capacity is then divided and expressed in various social activities. In cognition, which encompasses knowledge, ethics, and aesthetics, corresponding to the sciences, law, and fine arts. In the economy, where symbolic accumulation is physically transformed through the technical division of labor, ensuring the material foundations of society. In politics, where rules are established, the terms of modern society formation are defined, and its democratic function is carried out based on foundational values such as equality, freedom, and fraternity (Georgoulas, 2017).

Durkheim emphasized the importance of educational systems for social control and socialization of younger generations in modern societies with highly differentiated division of labor. Socialization and social control connect the groups formed in the division of labor with the

institutions that make social cohesion possible, despite their differences and conflicts. Durkheim considers the existence of common beliefs and feelings among different professional groups as a prerequisite for social cohesion. In modern societies, this is primarily achieved through educational institutions. Education contributes to a minimal uniformity of thought through the transmission of common values and norms, while also promoting the differentiation and specialization required by the division of social labor. According to Durkheim, education is defined as the influence exerted by generations of adults on younger individuals who are not yet ready for social life. Additionally, educational institutions, from kindergarten to university, are officially and exclusively tasked with the reproduction and certification of knowledge, as well as the upbringing of its holders. Educational institutions played a decisive role in the development of urban industrial societies, as they contributed to the adaptation of individuals to the new demands and conditions of work, political participation, and daily life (Durkheim, 1956).

This transfer occurs within a class-structured society, where there is a hierarchically organized division of labor among social classes and professional groups. Material inequality in the economic sphere is morally compensated and legitimized to some extent by public institutions, which, under the auspices of the state, express or protect civil, political, social, and cultural rights - what has historically been known as citizenship. Education is the cornerstone of these rights, as it equips everyone with the basic cognitive and moral prerequisites needed to exercise and claim them. It is also expected that symbolic accumulation will be distributed among individuals based on acquired abilities rather than inherited characteristics. Therefore, the right to education and the position of individuals and groups within educational institutions become subjects of competition for symbolic dominance. This competition serves as a strong legitimizing principle regarding equality among citizens, which is one of the fundamental components of modern ideology (Durkheim, 1984, 1956; Georgoulas 2017).

6. Bourdieu's concept of symbolic domination

How, then, are the content and form of education determined in relation to the division of labor? Is there a consensus around the symbols and representations that constitute concepts and rules, therefore, taken for granted? As Pierre Bourdieu (1991) showed, there is competition among social groups for symbolic domination, which is the power through which the sense of the obvious, the self-evident nature of things is established, confirming or transforming perceptions of the world. Symbols, such as those representing the mental categories of time, space, and causation, enable consensus around the meaning of various aspects of the world and contribute to the reproduction of a common perception of reality. This common perception combines knowledge and moral rules, leading to judgments about the correctness or legality of a given arrangement of social relations. Therefore, symbolic systems have a political dimension. Among these is ideology, a set of representations that reflect the partial interests of a class while appearing to represent universal interests.

The dominant culture conceals the function of division beneath the function of communication. It serves as the medium of communication and distinction simultaneously, compelling all other cultures (referred to as sub-cultures) to define themselves in relation to the dominant culture. Different classes and class fractions engage in a symbolic struggle over the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence to impose their preferred definition of the social world. This can be done directly or indirectly, often through specialists in symbolic production in various fields (such as scientific, political, artistic, etc.). Specialized discourses derive their effectiveness from the homology between these fields and the field of social classes. However, ideologies do not only reflect the interests of classes or class fractions, but also the specific interests of those who produce them and the unique logic of the production field. Symbolic power, ultimately, which can be as mobilizing as economic or physical power, stems from the belief in the legitimacy of words.

However, words alone cannot create this belief. It is a transformed, unrecognizable form of other types of power.

The individual's compliance with symbolic domination is neither passive submission to external constraints nor free adherence to values. It is the result of habits and dispositions (*habitus*) that are shaped not only through language and consciousness, but also through gestures, gaze, silence, and tone of voice. This complicity is inscribed in practical states, in the dispositions created by sanctions and chances of material or symbolic profit in various linguistic markets. The symbolic violence through which symbolic domination is achieved is felt like unstated intimidation coming from the threat of “falling from grace” in the eyes of a person who holds the dominant position in a power relation, exerted on those who are predisposed by their *habitus* to feel it. On the other hand, symbolic profit is achieved when one appropriates the highest expressive style in the hierarchy of styles, which corresponds to the hierarchy of social groups and possesses the competence to speak the legitimate language. This offers a profit of distinction to individuals, as chances of access to means of production of legitimate competence and to places of expression of the legitimate language are distributed unevenly between social groups. To use another of Bourdieu's terms (1991: 1-90), this offers “symbolic capital,” the recognition of a value from a social group, a value which can be transferred to other forms of capital.

7. Symbolic control vis-à-vis symbolic domination

Symbolic control refers to the consolidation of symbolic dominance in specific thought patterns that are used to control behavior. Bernstein highlights the difference between symbolic dominance, which produces power, and symbolic control, which focuses on appropriate forms of communication for different social groups. According to Bernstein, power creates and reinforces boundaries between social categories, groups, and discourses, while control pertains to the socialization of group members within those boundaries. Power deals with relations between categories, whereas control deals with relations within categories (Bernstein, 1996: 19-21).

Both Bourdieu and Bernstein place pedagogy, in its broader sense as a process of transmitting schemes of thought, in official (such as educational systems) or unofficial (such as family) settings at the core of their theories on symbolic power and symbolic control, respectively. Bourdieu's concept of symbolic domination focuses on the structural preconditions, specifically power relations between social groups, that create a “cultural arbitrary” – a system of signs without intrinsic validity. In this system, the content of pedagogic communication imposes meanings that reflect the objective (material and symbolic) interests of dominant groups onto the dominated. However, the imposition of meaning is not solely based on power, as it also involves universal principles, logic, or biology. Authority also plays a role in pedagogic communication, even in cases of the most universal meanings (such as science or technology) (Bourdieu, 1991: 1-10). For Bourdieu, symbolic power is not just a mechanical reflection of power relations; it adds an additional dimension where new power relations and antagonisms, with their unique logic, emerge. In essence, his approach aims to reveal the transformations through which power, while concealing its origins, generates new forms of power.

On the other hand, Bernstein's focus on pedagogy as the realization of symbolic control and thus of cultural production and reproduction is centered on “pedagogic discourses,” such as: *“the rules or principles for selecting and organising what is to be taught, how it is to be taught, and how it is deemed to have been acquired”* (Bernstein & Solomon, 1999: 269). His concept of symbolic control shifts the focus of the analysis of communication relations from the unequal distribution of material and symbolic resources among social groups to communication itself and the possibilities of producing new meanings that transcend existing codifications. The means by which consciousness is formed, as various forms of communication transmit the existing distribution of power and prevailing cultural categories, constitute instruments of symbolic

control. Basil Bernstein emphasizes that speech is not a simple voice that conveys ideology; it is not a conveyor belt that operates without affecting what it carries. The various forms of communication differ not only in terms of the power relations between different social groups but also in terms of the process of production, transmission, and acquisition of the various messages of communication by the individual. Symbolic control is defined as the control of behavior through communication, resulting in the formation of consciousness and the transmission of power relations, classifications, and evaluation criteria of dominant groups. However, since human communication and symbolic abilities transcend pre-existing thought patterns, symbolic control, although it imposes the established order, contains the potential for its modification, altering the terms of the struggle for dominance (Bernstein, 2003a: 135; Bernstein, 2003b: 114-182).

Overall, Bernstein's concept of symbolic control and Bourdieu's theory of symbolic power converge to reveal power relations in cultural transmissions, albeit from different perspectives. Interestingly, the former had to defend his approach from the rather undeserved accusation of essentialism made by the latter when he stated that Bernstein's description of the "elaborated code" is "fetishizing the official language... as it is constituted as the absolute norm of all linguistic practices to which can only be conceived in terms of the logic of deprivation..., without reflecting on the social conditions of its production" (Bourdieu, 1991: 53).

Since there is no room here to adequately expand on the "elaborated-restrictive" linguistic code distinction in Bernstein's theory, to which Bourdieu is referring, let's keep in mind that it involves different forms of speech systems arising from different social relations to which individuals are being socialized to shared meanings. In brief, two general types of code can be distinguished: elaborated and restricted. They can be defined, on a linguistic level, in terms of the probability of predicting for any one speaker which syntactic elements are to be used to organize meaning across a representative range of speech. The codes themselves are functions of a particular form of social relationship, or more generally, of qualities of social structures. A restricted code would define the form of social relationship by restricting the verbal signaling of individual differences, while an elaborated code facilitates the verbal construction and exchange of individualized or personal symbols.

In the restricted code, meanings are likely to be concrete, descriptive, or narrative rather than analytical or abstract. Middle-class children socialized can be expected to possess both an elaborated and a restricted code, while working-class children can be expected to be limited to a restricted code. The school, by privileging the elaborated code, reinforces this cultural backwardness (Bernstein, 1966). Bernstein holds that analyzing the internal logic of the elaborated code as a symbolic system does not equal considering this symbolic system as a universal invariant. Furthermore, he stresses that Bourdieu disregards the significance of the internal structure of a symbolic system and the way it interacts with the structure of the field in which it operates, considering only the latter as a legitimate sociological subject.

Despite Bourdieu's concern not to level all symbolic systems, stressing, as noted above, that meanings differ in their relation to universal principles of logic or biology, his theory of symbolic power does not offer criteria of differentiation. In addition, when examining art, science, or education, power relations are highlighted without an account of where that power leads to, whether it is the reproduction of power relations or the potential for individual and collective autonomy. However, Bourdieu is not indifferent to the symbolic content of a field in each of his works. For instance, in "The Inheritors," he suggests a didactic approach that could moderate the effects of unequal distribution of cultural capital between university students by making knowledge acquisition processes less obscure. Yet, his concept of symbolic power focuses on the qualities of a field of positions rather than the qualities of the symbolic system involved.

8. The field of symbolic control

In any case, while Bourdieu offered a theory of symbolic power, Bernstein has not elaborated a theory of symbolic control covering the entire range of empirical objects to which it applies, or its similarities and differences with similar concepts. The concept of symbolic control is defined as a part of an analytical framework designed to understand the social division of labor in which a field of professions regulates the mind, body, and social relations. His innovative study of pedagogic communication called for an updated framework for the theoretical categories of social stratification to accurately capture the relationship between knowledge, power, and consciousness (Bernstein, 2001b., 2001c). Thus, the conceptual content of the term “symbolic control” can only be understood within the framework of specialized discourses, agents, and agencies of the division of labor to which it belongs.

This division of labor is defined by two main categories: the economic field, where dominant agents and agencies control physical resources, and the field of symbolic control, where dominant agents and agencies specialize in discursive codes provided by higher education. These codes shape legitimate patterns of thought and emotion, as well as distribute forms of consciousness, disposition, and desire. Additionally, Bernstein excludes from the field of symbolic control agents from the economic field who perform symbolic control functions, such as theatres, private galleries, films, television, publishing houses, fashion and cosmetic firms. Bourdieu places these in the cultural field. The definition of the field of symbolic control is narrowed down to include only agents with an explicit normalizing function in education, administration, social services directly or indirectly regulated by the State (excluding churches) and closely subject to its policies.

He does so because, firstly, professionals in the private sector, such as doctors, lawyers, and psychotherapists, have different interests, motivations, and ways of relating compared to similar professionals in the public sector. Secondly, employees in the cultural field who serve as agents of symbolic control do not provide a service; they create a text but do not have power over it. For example, in film, media, fashion, art, etc. By bringing together professionals from different fields, one holding economic power and the other holding control over the text, agencies that market texts (theatre, films, publishing, media, private galleries, television, fashion, etc.) may vary in their orientation due to tensions between different interests and the formation of the two specialized fields.

Bernstein also developed a categorization of agents in the field of symbolic control according to their special function. These agents include religious and legal figures who define, monitor, maintain, and change the limits of behavior, as well as police and prison officials who oversee modes of interrogation and containment. Additionally, medical, psychiatric, and social services professionals diagnose, prevent, and repair disorders in the body, mind, and social relationships. The school system plays a role in reproducing dominant discourses, while mass and specialized media diffuse and recontextualize them. Civil services hold an administrative function, agents in the arts, crafts, sciences, and humanities create symbolic forms. In short, the field of symbolic control involves normalizing and legitimizing functions related to the body, social relations, social order, morals, mental health, national collective consciousness, and delinquency.

9. The Division of Legitimatization Labor: Consolidations and modifications of symbolic control

We can better understand the division of labor in the legitimization process by examining the example of how official discourse works. An official discourse serves three functions. First, it provides a diagnostic, an act of knowledge that defines what a person, thing, or category of persons is and assigns an identity. Second, administrative discourse issues directives,

orders, prescriptions, etc., about what people must do based on their identities. Third, it reports on what people have done in authorized accounts, such as police records. In each case, official discourse imposes a point of view that is established as legitimate, meaning everyone must recognize it (Bourdieu, 1989: 22).

Furthermore, R. Lenoir pointed out that social relations in modern societies are mediated by the state and its bureaucratic mechanisms, while the sciences are part of a social policy mechanism. They formulate and promote demands, produce representations that the sciences legitimize in the name of rationality, and ultimately establish them by law. Scientific concepts contribute to the normalization of behavior, meaning the acceptance of a behavior as “normal” or “natural,” as well as the acceptance of the authority of institutions over specific social categories. Through the legitimizing function of sciences, various social categories are linked to specific privileges and rights regarding their treatment by institutions. Scientific concepts also form the basis of the specialized knowledge applied by professional groups to address each social problem (Lenoir, 2004).

While these agents legitimize and normalize consciousness, identities, dispositions, and desires, they may also disturb this normalizing function through criticism and by developing new knowledge. Educational institutions that produce and transfer knowledge are integral to the formation of identity, consciousness, and the disposition of agents of symbolic control. These agencies are all involved in border disputes over discursive monopolies, not only for the symbolic property rights over different aspects of the clients but for the economic base that the monopoly creates.

Social sciences have played an active role in the process of forming what Abbot (1988) has called a “system of professions,” which developed with symbolic control as its central axis of activities. The term “system of professions” refers to a system of interdependent activities, where various professional groups possessing abstract knowledge claim jurisdiction or authority over problem-solving through the practical application of this knowledge. The jurisdiction of each profession is determined in relation to the others. A professional group may completely control a jurisdictional area and the professional groups under it or share it with other professional groups. Abstract knowledge allows for the redefinition of issues falling within its jurisdiction, its defense against claims, as well as the inclusion of new problems within it. Therefore, changes in one profession entail shifts in positions within the others of the same system of interdependence.

The application of specialists’ knowledge consists of a process of diagnosis and treatment where objects falling within their jurisdiction are classified and matched with appropriate solutions, or a process of reasoning to find solutions when the diagnosis-treatment connection is not clear. The capabilities of professional groups to maintain their domain depend partly on the symbolic dominance of the corresponding scientific group. The value of abstract knowledge does not guarantee the success of practical applications. Scientific knowledge contributes to the legitimization of professional work more for symbolic than practical reasons. Academic work legitimizes professional work by clarifying the foundations of applied knowledge, linking it with ideas and values that are constitutive of modern thought, science, and rationality. In this context, scientific research opens new fields of professional action, and university teaching allows for the control of knowledge reproduction terms.

With the claim of jurisdiction, each professional group articulates a request for recognition of its cognitive base, which entails some exclusive rights (e.g., monopoly in a specific practice, public subsidies, control of professional education, licensing procedures, etc.) depending on the audience addressed: the state, public opinion, or an institutionalized workplace. The connection of a profession with jurisdiction is achieved through engagement with an object, legitimized by official knowledge based on fundamental values. It is also achieved through the promotion of claims for rights in the competitive fields of public institutions and the legal system.

Changes in a system can be due to external and internal sources of differentiation. The former include the entry of new groups into the system, differentiation of clients or their enclosure, new technologies, changes in institutions, while the latter include the development of new knowledge and the increase in the level of professional organization (Abbot, 1988: 17-28, 65-74, 101-102, 141).

Furthermore, the clients of these services may also contribute to change. The concept of symbolic control does not imply passive consolidation of individuals and groups to symbolic dominance or mechanistic reproduction of thought patterns based on which behavior is controlled. This can also be deduced by P. Willis's (1981: 57) argument that: *"...the powerful do not always impose meanings without those meanings being taken into account by the dominated or at least by an important section of them."* This dominated response takes in meanings other than those coded in the dominant transmission, and this imposition itself must consider oppositional or alternative responses. His ethnographic work in school offers the empirical foundation of this point, and his conceptual demarcation of cultural production from cultural and social reproduction highlights the processes through which identities are created by the interpenetration of formal categories. As a domination to a form of power may reveal or resist another.

The unique functions that agents in the field of symbolic control serve in regulating and shaping the consciousness of other social groups place them in a distinct position compared to the dominant and subordinate classes in the economic field. The consciousness of individuals within social groups is shaped by their relationship to material production ownership, which determines their interests, orientation, and relationships. In contrast, their connection to education only influences their style of expression. Conversely, the consciousness of agents in symbolic control is influenced by both their education and their style of expression (Bernstein, 2001b: 119).

This could mean that for agents of symbolic control, there is a strong connection between the material conditions of existence and their ability to manipulate discursive codes. It follows that within the division of labor in the field of symbolic control, hierarchy is mostly the result of symbolic domination, with state resources and status credentials being the prices to pay. However, Bourdieu offers a more detailed analysis of the relationship between consciousness derived from objective interests and the style of expression that reflects subjective tastes and dispositions.

Agents, as defined by Bourdieu, are the holders of symbolic capital, which gives them a sense of distinction resulting from the internalization of social structures. These differences are perceived through categories adapted to the structure of the social world. Since these structures are presented as self-evident, objective structures, they coincide with embodied structures. In the symbolic struggle for the legitimate vision of the social world, agents utilize the symbolic capital they have acquired from previous struggles, as well as the power they hold over established taxonomies. These taxonomies are inscribed in minds or in objectivity, such as official qualifications and educational credentials. In the intermediate positions that agents of symbolic control occupy in the social space, where the uncertainty of relations between practices and positions is at its peak, symbolic strategies intensify (Bourdieu, 1985).

10. The historical perspective of the field of symbolic control

The historical perspective of Bernstein's theory of symbolic control captures the changing relations of education to the division of social labor, and subsequently, of education to symbolic control, and of symbolic control to the division of labor and social stratification. The new technologies of management and production prevailing as capitalism advanced made the links between education and the economy stronger. At the same time, the ideology of social mobility

contributed to maintaining structural relations between groups while changing them for individuals, legitimizing success or failure selectively.

The proliferation of specialized discourses made available by higher education coincided with the expansion and differentiation of agents of symbolic control. However, from the 1970s onwards, the state field of symbolic control lost autonomy as the state ideology and regulation of social control and education were dominated by the conservatism of the market. In the 21st century, in “reorganized” capitalism, the division of labor is simpler as production consists of a narrow range of executive-technological specialized functions. Symbolic control increases in complexity and extension, although the expansion of the cultural field could signify a blurring of its limits with symbolic control.

In fact, Bernstein speaks of a “totally pedagogized society” (Bernstein, 2001c: 31), in which social relations (family, health, work) are increasingly governed by pedagogic means: “The State’s withdrawal from the economic field is matched by its increased centralized management of the differentiated agencies of symbolic control, leading to the second totally pedagogized society; the first being that of the Medieval period, initiated and managed by religion. Bernstein insists that despite the growing automatization in the production of goods and services, the normalizing function of the field of symbolic control remains crucial as it ensures that the results of the division of labor will continue to be human: *“Only human agents operating through specialized discourses made available by education can transmit and transform the language of feeling and desire, which is the essence of symbolic control”* (Bernstein, 2001b: 136).

11. Conclusion

A sociological analysis of science’s contribution to the symbolically constituted normality reveals the organic connections between sciences, education, and the social regulation of thoughts and emotions. Thus, the empirical tracking of mutual determinations takes place in three levels of analysis: (a) The development of the division of labor, the creation of new professions, and the fluctuation of power relations between social classes and class fractions as consolidated in the state. (b) The accompanying and supplementary processes of cognitive differentiation and institutional consolidations with a focus on symbolic control. (c) The increasing role of sciences, especially social sciences, in shaping social categories through conceptual delineations and institutional regulations of behavior.

Recently, Bernstein’s concept of the field of symbolic control has been utilized to illustrate how the institutional consolidation of social sciences in the USA was intertwined with the development of adolescence as a social category, within the historical backdrop of larger changes in labor, family, education, and associated policies, social science theories became ingrained in institutions, thought processes, and behaviors pertaining to adolescents (Spyridakis, 2024). However, the theoretical perspective outlined above can be applied to any study focusing on either the conceptual content of knowledge or the institutional consolidations and policies that shape the fields in which knowledge is activated. Insights on how dominant discourses sustain power relations in the field of positions between agents of symbolic control should be combined with consideration of how the structure of these discourses reflects contradictions between social groups and, accordingly, how changes observed in power relations between groups as social division of labor develop, are reflected on the level of discourses. The benefit of such analysis could be twofold. Firstly, it helps determine the potential usefulness of each piece of knowledge beyond the current conditions of domination. Secondly, it allows for consideration of how these existing conditions may obscure certain aspects of human existence while emphasizing others, thereby limiting the scope of knowledge.

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Understanding the “Arab Socialism” in Egypt

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Abstract

The Arab socialism is a political ideology that combines Pan-Arabism and socialism. The influence of Arab socialism was in it pick on the 1950s and 1960s, while it was the ideologic basis of the Ba'ath Party and less influential on Nasser's movement in Egypt. This term should not be mixed with socialist thinking in the Arab world, which was fifty years before the Arab socialism. The socialism idea came to the Arab world by the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, about a hundred years after it was developed in France and in England. The term was first translated “Ajathmaaya” and then “Ashtrachia” that means cooperative, a meaning that is different from the western origin, therefore the name origin and its development should be examined first. The origin of the noun socialism is in the Latin word socialis – social. One of the most important designers of the socialist ideal is Karl Marx. Arab socialism rejects the anti-nationalist approach of socialism. However, the regimes that were supposed to strengthen the working class, create equality, and reduce gaps failed to reach the working class, and the situation of the poor did not improve, and in fact, the situation of the lower class and the fringe of the middle class did not improve. As the development of industry is minimal, so is the development of the proletariat and its weight in the general population and even among the urban population. In Egypt, the most developed of the Arab countries, the percentage of industrial workers did not reach 10% of the total urban population in 1958 (i.e. 6 years after the officers' coup)! But we should not underestimate the power of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) that was established (the Arab Socialist Union) and its influence (Nasser's vision of pan-Arabism). The Six-Day War found the organization at the peak of its political and organizational power. Ali Sabri, who was the Secrein-General of the ASU in the two years preceding the war, managed to transform it from a bureaucratic organization lacking political influence into an organization with political and organizational capacity whose political influence was considerable.

Keywords: Egypt, Egyptian politics, Ba'ath Party, Nazarism, Socialism.

1. Introduction

The Arab socialism is a political ideology that combines Pan-Arabism and socialism. The influence of Arab socialism was in it pick on the 1950s and 1960s, while it was the ideologic basis of the Ba'ath Party and less influential on Nasser's movement in Egypt. This term should not be mixed with socialist thinking in the Arab world, which was fifty years before the Arab socialism.

The socialism idea came to the Arab world by the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, about a hundred years after it was developed in France and in England. The term was first translated “Ajathmaaya” and then “Ashtrachia” that means

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cooperative, a meaning that is different from the western origin, therefore the name origin and its development should be examined first. The origin of the noun socialism is in the Latin word *socialis* – social. One of the most important designers of the socialist ideal is Karl Marx. Arab socialism rejects the anti-nationalist approach of socialism.

The socialist movement began its way in the modern world in the working-class movement at the end of the 19th century. In this time, the term “socialism” was first and foremost linked to European social critics, who criticized capitalism and the property term. According to Karl Marx, who has defined and shaped the socialist movement in the modern era, socialism is the socio-economic stage after the proletariat revolution and after all production products will be transferred to joint ownership. According to Marx, society will advance from this stage to the stage of communism.

Many different streams may be called or were called by others “socialistic”. Since the 19th century there is no consent about the doctrine or strategy for achieving the movement goals in the socialist movement. The supporters of the various socialist movements sometimes belong to opposing streams, and one can especially distinguish between reformists and communists. Some of the socialists believe in nationalization of production while others, for example social democrats support the nationalization of a limited number of key industries, within an integrated economic system. Some of the Marxists support central planning of the economy carried out by the state, like the Soviet model, others, including the communists in Yugoslavia and Hungary (since the 1970s), the reformists in China and some of western economists, support integration of socialism and market economy, trying to use the market economy advantages for the socialists’ principles. Anarcho-syndicalists and some supporters of the New Left support the establishment of “Workers’ Councils” and managing the production means through them. There are some additional streams.

2. Arab socialism (الاشتراكية العربية)

The Arab socialism is a political ideology that combines Pan-Arabism and socialism. The influence of Arab socialism was in its pick on the 1950s and 1960s, while it was the ideologic basis of the Ba'ath Party and less influential on Nasser's movement in Egypt. This term should not be mixed with socialist thinking in the Arab world, which was fifty years before the Arab socialism.

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The term “Arab socialism” was coined by Michel Aflak, one of the founders of the Ba'ath party in Syria, to distinguish between his socialism and other socialism streams.

2.1 Nasser's image and personality in the process of determining his policy

It is important to analyze Nasser's growth sources to understand his ideological values and approaches to perceive the meaning of Nasser's leadership in Egypt. It should be remembered:

First – he was the first Egyptian leader who ruled Egypt since the Pharaoh time. He was a Nile native, a true Egyptian.

Second – he was a military leader, and in Arab-Islamic history, the legitimate claims for authority and leadership were based on military empowerment and success.

Third – his leadership was based on a series of political successes – elimination of the monarchy and the oligarchy, purification of politics from corruption, and attempt of agrarian reform.

Fourth – His modernizing leadership in nature – in aspiration to bring socio-economic changes and change the *Egyptian society's image*, emphasizing the revolutionary change in politics and building a new system. Nasser's rule is an example of a patrimonial regime – the army role in political systems, informality in decision making process, the personal nature of the regime, the absence of corporate interests and a broad middle class, and lack of institutionalization of the political system. Political structures, mass parties and real political participation, did not succeed due to Nasser's personalistic rule.

Although in the past this phenomenon was based on land ownership and wealth, in Nasser's time, clientelism was based on personal strategic relations with policy makers. However, it still not providing sufficient organizational basis for government. As mentioned, "Egyptians do not operate in organized groups..." Corporatism never ingrained in Egyptian society: because the economic system was always had to answer the political government due to cultural-political factors, which were related to the non-institutionalization of Islam, and the absence of class and ethnic ties.

Political clientelism has united the political system for centuries. It was informal, personalistic and was based on unifying leadership. The "divide and conquer" tactic was accepted in Nasser's leadership style. However, he managed to unite all the revolution officers, while cooperating between them and being loyal to him. In this sense, the statement that post-coup Egypt is an "integrative and non-competitive society" is correct. However, the charismatic phenomenon is a result of severe socio-political crises. The modernization crises are the main causes of the need for charismatic leadership. Namely, charismatic leadership is a function of internal situation in developing countries – the desire to achieve consensus, legitimacy and integration.

The researcher Dekmejian analyses Nasser's leadership by the *charism theory* he believes, and the researcher Weber offers a tri-polar interpretation of historical and social change. In times of severe socio-political crises and the traditional society falling, the charismatic personality rises, becomes routine and leads to regime bureaucratization. Without entering into theoretical limitations, the Egyptian socio-political situation demonstrates the validity of Nasser's charismatic personality. It had its own image, communication ability, influence, and credibility – the three skills that every charismatic personality must have. His leadership was largely personalistic, and the political system is clientelist. It is essential to largely analyze this subject to know and understand Nasser's place in the decision-making process and in shaping the Egyptian policy¹.

Tactically, Nasser's political activity was expressed in pragmatism, which means a struggle on one front at a time, while isolating and neutralizing the other fronts until the end of the fight. Abdel-Kader Hatem has explained it well, calling it "the one front system": "... the system was set by the revolution leader... when ending one stage, the revolution has prepared itself to the second stage...". For this reason, the researchers or policy makers often saw Nasser to be moderate, ready to compromise and negotiate, in doing so, the West was impressed that it would be possible to reach an agreement with him. Schematically, it can be described as follows: there is an event that is important to Egypt, and Nasser reacts according to the circumstances of the event, but

¹ Bukai, D. (1978). *Nasser and the "Baghdad Alliance" shaping foreign policy ideologies in Egypt*. M.A. dissertation, the department of Social Sciences, University of Haifa, pp. 23-25.

mainly tactically. During the implementation and execution of the response, a more inclusive policy is set that is ideologically justified.²

For Nasser, Arab unity meant solidarity, alignment of the Arab countries foreign policies, and realizing a form of joint political and economic arrangements. He sought to control the foreign policy of Arab countries, but not to annex them or merge with them. He called on the Arabs to unite under his leadership and adopt a common foreign policy. In his opinion, Arab solidarity is the basis for Arab nationalism. It will strengthen the Arab countries through cooperation in economic, military and foreign policy fields. The union is not an inevitable and obligatory step. For Nasser, Arab nationalism is absolute independence from any foreign influence, and its external political content is neutralism between the superpowers. He emphasized Arabism as a main political and social weapon in the hands of the Arabs:

“... that protects the Arab nation from imperialist intrigues... nationalism is a means of preserving independence and freedom... and making Pan-Arabism to be the main issue, part of each Egyptian’s cognitive content.

“... our revolution was due to Arab nationalism... the Arab nation has common history and destiny...”

“Arab nationalism is not just a political movement, it is a social philosophy... common interest, strategic necessity...”

From now on, the enemies of the Egyptian people are those external factors that stand between Egypt and its destiny. The fact that Egypt is a leader and speaks for the region countries, and negotiate in their behalf with foreign parties, will support its prestige in the region, and its importance in the international system, it will mainly be a means to obtain economic and military aid from foreign parties and will lead to the socio-economic development of Egypt. A united Arab world under the leadership of Egypt will inevitably raise Nasser's prestige and the superpowers will have to consider him as a factor in the international system.³

All the ambitious development plans of Egypt regarding industrialization, economic development, and military power development, created a strong incentive to turn to foreign policy in order to obtain massive aid. The intention was to translate Egypt’s influence in the Arab world into control over Arab oil sources and get considerable economic and military assistance from both superpowers. Copeland describes that in one of the meetings organized by Nasser in 1954 to discuss the foreign policy he was asked why not go to the North African Union. Nasser replied that there is only geographical interest, the Maghreb may be a goal, but what is the power of such a union? The Arabs in the East have oil, transportation arteries and the Palestinian problem, and all these interests in the West and the USSR.

In the meeting it was described as follows:

“... Egyptian foreign policy is Egypt’s main investment and its power. Due to its influence in Asia and Africa, Egypt can influence global movements, all for economic profit.

Arabism was used to get support, justify policies and legitimize the domestic regime. Its empowerment and effectiveness were a flame in Islamic society, which has directly and emotionally addressed to the people. In this sense, Arabism is an ideal instrument for taking a popular and active policy as one. Formulating foreign policy goals is mainly a cognitive process.

² Bukai, D. (1978). *Nasser and the "Baghdad Alliance" shaping foreign policy ideologies in Egypt*. M.A. dissertation, the department of Social Sciences, University of Haifa, p. 11 (introduction).

³ Bukai, D. (1978). *Nasser and the "Baghdad Alliance" shaping foreign policy ideologies in Egypt*. M.A. dissertation, the department of Social Sciences, University of Haifa, pp.158-159.

However, it is carried out in the external-executive environment. The implementation process requires various methods called “political means”, which are both conceptual and operational. What means Nasser used to promote Egypt’s inter-Arab goals?

First, referring Islam as a religion and political instrument. Islam is not an important element in the political system of the Nasser regime, it was referred within the historical-religious framework, and not a factor of political-social importance. However, most of the “free officers” members are related to the traditional system of Egypt, therefore, there were no revolutionaries who were related to religion and secularism.

Second, Israel as a tool in inter-Arab policy. Until the end of 1954 the conflict with Israel was not an important motive in Egypt policy, “Palestine problem” was third in the Egyptian foreign policy priority during the two first years after British evacuation and uniting with Sudan. Nasser expressed it in saying that the struggle with Israel will postpone and delay the internal reforms, which the regime believe are the basis of its activity and therefore are more important. This emphasis of social and economic reforms was due to Nasser’s conclusion that the Arab defeat in 1948 was a result of their weakness rather than Israel’s power.⁴

2.2 *The influence of external factors on Nasser’s policy*

A new era began in the Middle East in general and in relation to the Palestinian problem in particular following the Kadesh operation results and the Suez Battle in October-November 1956, Jamal Abdel Nasser was the charismatic leader of Egypt and the entire Arab world. The first result of his political victory was his massive appeal to the Arab region to establish his leadership in the Arab world after he was recognized as the undisputed leader of Egypt. Nasser politically conquest the Arab world through preaching the idea of Arab nationalism (al-Kumiya al-Arabiya) which was the axis of Arab politics in the reviewed period and after it. This idea was mentioned in some of his speeches in 1955, but without explaining its meaning. In his speech on November 7, 1957, Nasser began the long and vigorous campaign for the idea. The period between 1957-1961 was the heyday of Arab nationalism and its peak in the United Arab Republic (UAR) which was established following the union between Egypt and Syria in February 1958. This nationalist plan was the essence of Nasserism. An entire generation of Arab leaders was educated following Nasser’s theory. Nasser preached an active and militant Arab nationalism that would use all means, including force, to achieve its goals. He believed that in the Arab nationalism he preaches, he expresses the aspirations of the Arab nation more than any other Arab leader in his time. He defined several goals for Arab nationalism, including the political, social, and economic liberation of the Arab world and elimination of imperialism and Arab reaction. Arab nationalism was designed to fill the empty space created in the Arab world after eliminating the Western influence. He believed that Arab nationalism is the strongest weapon of the Arab world and the guarantee for its security. Arab nationalism means Arab solidarity (later he added “Arab uniqueness”) that is based on independence of Arab countries, later he has added contents as positive neutrality, non-identification, social justice and real democratic life.⁵

In one of his speeches, he defined Arab nationalism as a “spiritual movement” and a “historical movement”, without explaining these terms. He threatened to use military force to protect Arab nationalism, and indeed invaded Yemen in 1962-1967. Nasser divided the Arab world into his allies and his enemies, nationalists and imperialism agents, progressives and

⁴ Bukai, D. (1978). *Nasser and the "Baghdad Alliance" shaping foreign policy ideologies in Egypt*. M.A. dissertation, the department of Social Sciences, University of Haifa, pp. 160-161.

⁵ Shemesh, M. (2004). *From the Nakba to the Naksha, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem 1957-1967, Nasser’s path to the Six Day War*. Ben-Gurion Institute Publishing, p. 1.

reactionaries. On this basis he strove to change regimes that did not go his way. The dissolution of the Egypt and Syria union in September 1961 symbolized the beginning of the Arab nationalism decline according to Nasser's theory. This idea suffered the real blow in the Arab military defeat in June 1967. In October 1960, when Nasser was at the peak of his glory, Al-Ahram newspaper wrote about Arab nationalism and its fulfillment:

“Arab nationalism is spreading every day among the Arab masses in the area between the Atlantic Sea to the Persian Gulf. Every Arab feels this nationality and believes that he is a member of the Arab nation. But the mission of Arab nationalism these days is the mission of active action for realizing the nationalism from an idea into a dynamic actual fact.”

During this period, Nasser was the undisputed leader of the Arab world, while “Arab nationalism has a victory after a victory”. Arab public opinion outside of the UAR, especially in the Arab Mashrak (East), was rapturous by Nasser and the union he symbolized. This reality did not change even after the UAR dissolution. The stable regime in Egypt was confronted by a vibrant and unstable Arab world. The political events in the Arab world and in the Arab countries, including Iraq, Syria and Jordan, were all around Nasser's steps and decisions in the Arab arena or a result of them, even during the “depression” period in his leadership after the dissolution of the UAR. Nasser was forced – both due this struggle and the communist danger to Syria (which was part of the UAR), especially after the communists' activity increased there – to openly launch an ideological attack on communism, which he completely rejected, and on the internal regime in the Soviet Union, his friend. Communism was described in the Arab countries as a betrayal of Arab nationalism, apostasy to Islam. The agents of Moscow who have collaborated with imperialism and Zionism were communism's messengers to eliminate Arab nationalism. On the other hand, the special social content of Arab nationalism advocated by Nasser was emphasized. But the Soviet Union has eventually succeeded in patch things up with Nasser to prevent erosion in its positions in the Arab countries and prevent the Egyptians from turning to the West again.⁶

The Israel Issue: The change in Egyptian policy towards Israel at the beginning of 1955 was due to internal unrest and seeing Israel as an essential means in inter-Arab policy to achieve the Egyptian foreign policy goals. A change in this attitude may be seen in the many statements Nasser and his friends began to make, clearly defining their position in relation to Israel.⁷

3. Nasser's policy and socialism

The first factor – and the researcher Eliyahu Agassi (1970) also spoke about this - is the awareness of backwardness in the Arab world in general, and in Egypt in particular. The researcher emphasizes: not only the fact of backwardness but the backwardness awareness. The Arab world stays behind the developed countries, and it is not that we are so smart and educated to know this – they also know and strongly know it. For example, the national convention – the basic document of the new, socialist Egypt – from 1962, mentions “the solution of social and economic backwardness problem.” The researcher emphasizes this point as one of the factors, and maybe the most important. The Arab world is backward, and it knows it, the backwardness awareness is a fundamental motive for everything that happens.

The second factor – the awareness of oppression and exploitation, both internal and external. There is a fact and there is awareness, it is well known, and it has only been mentioned.

⁶ Shemesh, M. (2004). *From the Nakba to the Naksha, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem 1957-1967, Nasser's path to the Six Day War*. Ben-Gurion Institute Publishing, pp. 2-3

⁷ Shemesh, M. (2004). *From the Nakba to the Naksha, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian problem 1957-1967, Nasser's path to the Six Day War*. Ben-Gurion Institute Publishing, p.162

The third factor – is disappointment with capitalism. Egypt was disappointed by the attempts to solve its problems through economic, social or political methods according to the capitalist system, whether it be foreign-European capitalism or national-original capitalism. After all, those who rule Egypt now, the officers, the people of Arab socialism, did not start out as socialists. For years, until the end of the fifties, they did not talk about socialism. In Nasser's book *The philosophy of revolution* the term socialism does not appear at all, not even negatively. It was not a challenge that needed to be met. Their initial intentions were to encourage national capitalism. One of the three main goals of the agrarian reform was to encourage Egyptian capital to invest in industry rather than in speculations and lands. But they were disappointed and saw that private Egyptian capital is not right and cannot advance the economy and society. In 1955 Nasser spoke with Western socialist about the fact that the local Egyptian capitalists are unable to fulfil the role intended for them. He said: "We do not have capitalists; we only have brokers." Meaning, Nasser concluded that the capitalist way is not good for solving Egypt's terrible problems, neither for solving its social problems nor for solving its national problems. Of course, disappointment with capitalism is a very strong motive for embarking on the socialist path.

The fourth factor – is a general global mindset. Socialism may have many interpretations and definitions, in any case, a socialist spirit is blowing in the Afro-Asian world. There is a socialist fashion and there is no doubt that such general mindsets strongly influenced Egypt.⁸

3.1 *The origin of Abdel Nasser's Arab socialism lies in three motives*

a. Actions taken to ensure the establishment and physical security of the regime (enemy elimination and the "reaction"), cultivating layers of those who benefit materially, or at least psychologically, from the regime existence.

b. Steps taken to concentrate the capital assets and human resources required to fulfill the regime's ambitions, which are ambitions for prestige, for pretentious industrialization, for a major military buildup and creating other necessary conditions the regime think necessary to fulfill its great ambition – hegemony over the Arab world.

c. It should be noted that additional steps with sincere social consciousness background of the leader and the top brass, who strive for more social justice for the Egyptian people within the country were taken.⁹

3.2 *The incarnations of Nasserism*

The socialism development in Egypt had periods, and in 1952 - 1956 they did not even think about socialism, these are the years when the regime had to decide what it wanted, what it was looking for, and what it was striving for? During these years they maintained the social status quo. The agrarian reform was quite moderate and capitalist free initiative was encouraged. During this period, the private initiative was guaranteed the largest dividends and profits that Egypt had ever known. In 1956, after the terrible psychological shock of the Kadesh Operation, Suez and the economic blockade, there was a change, first in central, public planning (the economic institution), and in the "restriction" of foreign capital assets. In 1960-1961 they saw the beginning of the transition process to a more extreme economic-social policy, nationalization, expropriations, and

⁸ Be'erry, A. (1970). Nasser's Socialism. In: Z. Goldberg (Ed.) *Arab Socialism*. Beit Berl Publishing House, pp. 22-23.

⁹ S, Ernie. (1970). Arab Socialism - Pragmatism without performance – ideology. In: Z. Goldberg (Ed.) *Arab Socialism*. Beit Berl Publishing House, p.145.

considerable expansion of public sector bureaucratic infrastructure. In these years the implementation of the first general, large and pretentious five-year plan was announced, with almost exclusive use of public capital. The last period is from the summer of 1961 until the 1970s, is characterized by extreme socialism in which the economic branches were nationalized. 100 percent of the bankers and insurance companies, and 90% of the large and medium-sized industry are in the public sector hands: in fact, only workshops remained in private capital hands (1970), most of the services (including the transport, shipping and aviation companies) were nationalized, despite a certain worsening of the agrarian reform, “Arab socialism” hardly touched agriculture, and the revolution is hardly felt in the countryside.¹⁰

At first, they have limited the ownership of share capital per citizen to 10,000 pounds, but after a short time they nationalized it too. They have set: a maximum salary of 5,000 pounds per person per year, progressive income tax up to 90 percent of income, a minimum salary of 18 cents for agriculture and 25 cents for simple workers: profits and distributions to employees at a rate of 25% of profits per year (10% in cash and 15% in social services). They also shared the employees in the factory management in every public enterprise, 7 managers, of which 2 are elected by the employees and 5 are appointed according to the president’s orders. After a while, the number increased to 9 managers, of which 4 were elected by the employees and officials. Free education in all levels, including the university, was promised, although there has been a large quantitative expansion in education at the expense of quality. A 7-hour workday was introduced.

3.3 *The effect of the national coup*

“The coup heralded the end of imperialism and the regime liberation from the domination of feudalism and capitalism, for the establishment of social justice and the elimination of the contradictions between the classes, and for the rescue of the oppressed from their oppressors. The coup will turn employees into unexploited property owners and will work for the benefit of all classes,” in these words defined the President of Egypt, Abdel Nasser, the fundamental ideological principles of his regime, when it began on July 22, 1961 with the realization of “Arab socialism” in the “Land of Nile.”¹¹ Nasser’s “Arab socialism” grew and developed on the ground of the Egyptian reality and its unique economic-social conditions. Although ideological foreign currents, some global and some Arab, had an important part in the social ideological development of the Egyptian coup leaders, the Nasser’s “Arab socialism” is mainly an Egyptian creation and a result of a pragmatic coping with unique historical conditions and consequences of international power centers that operated and operate in this reality, and its development should only be understood against this background.¹²

4. The main trends and lines that characterize the “Arab socialism”

4.1 *The agrarian reform failures*

The Nazar regime does not stop praising the agrarian reform by emphasizing that it reflects today, as it reflected in the past, the revolutionary change of the Egyptian. The agrarian

¹⁰ S, Ernie. (1970). Arab Socialism - Pragmatism without performance – ideology. In: Z. Goldberg (Ed.) *Arab Socialism*. Beit Berl Publishing House, p. 146

¹¹ Efrat, M. (1970). Arab socialism in Egypt - in practice. In: Z. Goldberg (Ed.) *Arab Socialism*. Beit Berl Publishing House, p. 83

¹² Ben Zur, A. (1965). *Arab Socialism, Ideology and Action*. The Department of Culture of the National Kibbutz, Hashomer Hatzair, p. 41.

reform in Egypt – for all its regulations from 1952 until now (the seventies) has not caused a radical change in the social-class structure of the Egyptian countryside.

4.1.1 *Pseudo-agricultural cooperative*

The regime made quit an effort to prevent a serious weaken in the status of estate owners and the middle class, due to its policy of not providing extensive and sufficient financial and technical assistance to the Egyptian peasants, this policy was reflected in at least two areas:

- a. A constant reduction in the agricultural credit the authorities give to the peasants.
- b. Lowering the prices of agricultural products sold by the peasants to the authorities who pay prices that are lower than the wholesale price in the Egyptian markets.

In addition, the status of the estate owners and the middle class in the countryside was strengthened. The Egyptian authorities began to organize in 1952 and especially in 1961 the agricultural cooperative in the Egyptian countryside. The cooperative in Egypt is far from having the qualities and values of a voluntary member association, who have a cooperative awareness or understanding. The agricultural cooperative in Egypt is just a body operated by the authorities through an appointed mechanism that manages the cooperative “in behalf” and “for” the members “until they have cooperative recognition and have appropriate qualifications.”

4.2 *The social backwardness is constant*

However, the value and weight of the policy of the Nasser regime, to expand health services in the Egyptian countryside, compared to the situation during the monarchy should not be underestimated. In addition, infant mortality up to the age of one year has decreased, but in education in the countryside there have still been almost no important changes, unlike the impression created by Cairo's publications on the quantitative expansion of *education*. The housing conditions in the countryside are getting worse every year. Not only experts talk about the dire situation of the Egyptian countryside, but even Abdel Nasser himself admits this when he said in his speech in 1966: “Always remember that there are still temporary employees in Egypt, who go to work with onions and beans provisions for a month, this is a society that we must save , to this very day I have not been able to change it even though I spoke about it back in 1953.” Is it true that since he spoke about the problem, it was not possible to lay at least the foundations for a fundamental change in the situation of the peasant, if not changing it de facto?¹³

4.3 *Industrial employees at the bottom*

Much has been written about the industrialization and development policy of the Nasser regime, emphasizing Nasser's dedication to cultivate the industrial proletariat in his country, is this indeed the case? It is worth mentioning that due to the “socialist decrees” from July 1961, which were also reflected in the regime's takeover of the modern, developed part of the Egyptian economy in industry, finance, transportation and trade, it was determined that: the industrial employee will work seven hours a day rather than eight hours as was customary, the industrial employees will be shared in 25% from the factory net profits, the employees will participate in the public industry management by sending four elected representatives to the

¹³ Efrat, M. (1970). Arab socialism in Egypt - in practice. In: Z. Goldberg (Ed.) *Arab Socialism*. Beit Berl Publishing House, pp. 83-86.

factory management. These “benefits”, in fact, are not so meaningful as it seems at first, the shortening of daily working hours harms the industrial employees, and the employees’ share of the profits – it reduces the distributed amount. The price increase that was abolished in Egypt in 1961 has limited the importance of profit distribution, since it hardly allows a price increase level compensation. However, these profits do not compensate the employee for an income loss resulting from overtime work and/or any additional employment outside the factory. In addition, the Egyptian authorities are far from allowing laborers to represent the employees in the factory managements, thanks to the definition that says, “a laborer is any employee who lives by his salary, whether he does mental or physical work.” In the 1960s the industrial employees in Egypt are at the bottom of the salary ranks as they were before, moreover, in the public sector alone, their situation is relatively less benign.

4.4 The new class

The social gap widened as the mechanism’s control over the resources of the Egyptian economy increased, because of the many nationalizations in Egypt, especially since the beginning of “Arab Socialism” implementation in July 1961. This development even increased the number of special “white collar” employees in the upper class who have many pleasures and powers. While the senior manager layer was only 0.1% of the entire government apparatus, the layer of senior managers in the public sector – the “new class” – was 1.5% of all the employed clerkships. The “new class” is the social stratum that receives the most benefits and material pleasures under the regime of Abdel Nasser, although the regime especially emphasizes in its propaganda the pleasures the industrial employees receive.¹⁴

5. The lower levels of the medium class and its revolutionary role

In 1958, the class distribution of the urban population in Egypt was estimated as follows:

Table 1.

The class	Percentage in general population	Average annual income per capita in EGP
Bourgeoisie and aristocracy	3	8458
<u>Lower middle-class layers</u>	8	133.5
a. mid-level clerks, liberal professions	9	122.7
b. craftsmen (employers)	14	105.6
c. low-level clerks		
<u>Proletariat</u>	10	60.8
a. industrial and transport employees		
b. artisans	5	40
<u>Sub- proletariat</u>	2	26.8
a. regular roustabout	12	21.4
b. house servants		
c. out of permanent work	37	-

Source 1: Ben-Zur, A. Arab Socialism, pp. 9

¹⁴ Efrat, M. (1970). Arab socialism in Egypt - in practice. In: Z. Goldberg (Ed.) *Arab Socialism*. Beit Berl Publishing House, pp. 87-88

The data presented in this table shows that the lower layers of the middle class - three layers that are very close in terms of average annual income per capita, are 31% of the total urban population of Egypt, compared to 3% of the big bourgeoisie and aristocracy, and 15% of “sub-proletariat”. This highlights the great quantitative weight of the middle class towards both the big bourgeoisie and the proletariat.¹⁵

Table 2. Egypt's national income composition
1960-1965

	1959/60 in millions EGP	%	1964/65 in millions EGP	%	1969/70 in millions EGP	%
Agriculture	400	31.2	512	28.5	627	24.5
Industry and construction	325	25.4	591	32.9	877	34.2
Others	557	43.4	692	38.6	1,060	41.3
Total	1,282	100	1,795	100	2,564	100

Table 3. Salary development in agriculture and industry
By the five-year plan
1960-1970

	1959/60		1964/65		Growth
Agriculture					
Number of employees	1,130,000		1,310,000		15.8%
Employee's average yearly salary	120	EGP	130	EGP	8.3%
Number of entrepreneurs	2,115,000		2,490,000		13.0%
Average rent in agriculture	125	EGP	137	EGP	9.6%
Total engaged in agriculture	4,220,000		4,660,000		10.4%
Net income from agriculture	400,000,000	EGP	512,000,000	EGP	28%
Average income for agricultural provider	95	EGP	110	EGP	15.6%
Industry					
Number of employees	528,000		732,000		28.4%
Employee's yearly salary	91,000,000	EGP	155,000,000	EGP	70.3%
Employee's average yearly salary	172	EGP	211	EGP	22.6%

6. Conclusion

Economic development was the most important goal in developing countries, after the struggle for independence, both in terms of the regime's priority and in terms of the leadership's promises. Without promises of improving living standards, achieving industrialization and modernizing society, there will be considerable difficulties in achieving the regime's legitimacy. The process of socio-economic change in most developing countries is inconsistent, discontinuous, fraught with obstacles and dependent on foreign capital.

The main means of overcoming these crises (as noted in the work describing Nasser's work) is the creation of national emotions and symbols to bring about broad community commitment. Nationalism and comprehensive independence provide an essential psychological basis for achieving legitimacy and authority for leadership, and these are expressed mainly in their context with external factors because of the leadership's turn to an active foreign policy.

¹⁵ Ben Zur, A. (1965). *Arab Socialism, Ideology and Action*. The Department of Culture of the National Kibbutz, Hashomer Hatzair, p. 9.

Nasser's worldview and ambition can be seen in his essay “The Philosophy of the Revolution.” Nasser summarized his doctrine in it, presenting the ideology of the three circles: Arab, Muslim, and African, and in practice worked in the Arab circle.

Most of the goals that Nasserism set for itself were not achieved.

Furthermore, Nasserism failed to fulfill the historical mission it took on. Its failures or lack of achievements in each of these areas of action ultimately eroded the validity of the vision and the credibility of the entire movement and were a major factor in the decline of Nasserism.

The regimes that were supposed to strengthen the working class, create equality, and reduce gaps failed to reach the working class, and the situation of the poor did not improve, and in fact, the situation of the lower class and the fringe of the middle class did not improve, and even worsened, when most of the resources were invested in:

- A. Securing the physical foundation of the regime.
- B. Concentration of capital in the hands of the regime, industrialization of military buildup (engaging in a military race against Israel).
- C. Failure to implement and provide true social justice.

In fact, it was not possible to eliminate the remnants of feudalism and carry out an agrarian reform and industrial revolution that were the indispensable condition not only for the possibility of the rise of the working class, but also for the uninterrupted development of the middle classes. The young and weak working class could not serve as an alternative to carrying out the “bourgeois-democratic revolution” which subsequently developed into a real socialist revolution. The Arab countries (Egypt in particular) did not have the ability to provide a solution to the labor shortages that were constantly expanding because of natural increase and the migration of the unemployed from the countryside to the city. Most of the proletariat lacked elementary education and literacy and were captive to foreign, religious, nationalist class ideologies. It was difficult to influence and reach the lower strata of the middle class, which is a large one.

The young and weak working class could not serve as an alternative to carrying out the “bourgeois-democratic revolution” that would subsequently lead to a real socialist revolution.

As the development of industry is minimal, so is the development of the proletariat and its weight in the general population and even among the urban population. In Egypt, the most developed of the Arab countries, the percentage of industrial workers did not reach 10% of the total urban population in 1958 (i.e. 6 years after the officers' coup)!

But we should not underestimate the power of the Arab Socialist Union (ASU) that was established (the Arab Socialist Union) and its influence (Nasser's vision of pan-Arabism). The Six-Day War found the organization at the peak of its political and organizational power. Ali Sabri, who was the Secretary-General of the ASU in the two years preceding the war, managed to transform it from a bureaucratic organization lacking political influence into an organization with political and organizational capacity whose political influence was considerable. For example, when Nasser resigned in June 1967, Sabri used his power and influence on the Socialist Youth Organization to prevent Nasser's resignation and the transfer of the presidency to Zakaria Muhi al-Din. It was the members of the Socialist Youth Organization who launched mass demonstrations on June 9 and 10 that returned Nasser to power.

“Arab socialism” despite its failure to meet its tasks and achieve its goal still signifies the vision of Arab unity and the desire to return to live as an Arab power. It is consolidated among nations through giving and receiving against capitalism and class warfare, in a way and manner that is uniquely Arab and Islamic, Nasser's ambition that failed.

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